THE CULTUS
OF THE
SACRAMENTAL PRESENCE

ALFRED DAVENPORT KELLY

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THE CULTUS

OF THE SACRAMENTAL PRESENCE IN THE EUCHARIST AND IN THE RESERVED SACRAMENT

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THE CULTUS OF THE SACRAMENTAL PRESENCE IN THE EUCHARIST AND IN THE RESERVED SACRAMENT

BY

ALFRED DAVENPORT KELLY, M.A.

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LONDON
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NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
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PREFACE

THERE are a few special points discussed in this book to which I should like to call attention in order to guard myself from the outset against possible misconceptions.

1. To some people the word "cultus" suggests practices that are unbalanced, superstitious, or non-Christian. Strictly speaking, however, the word implies nothing derogatory. I can explain my use of it as follows. Among Christians who pay adoration to the sacramental presence (whether in the eucharist only or in the reserved sacrament also) we can distinguish two attitudes. Some of them urge that such adoration should be *incidental only;* while others use the presence systematically *for the purpose* of adoration (though not *mainly or only* for this purpose)—they come to the altar or to the tabernacle "to worship Jesus," as well as to communicate and to share in the sacrifice. The word "cultus" seems to express this attitude, and it is in this sense that I have used it. (See Chap. IV.)

2. I have aimed at showing that the cultus of the sacramental presence in the eucharist is legitimate and desirable, while in the case of the cultus of the

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reserved sacrament the objections outweigh what can be said in its favour. At the same time, I have urged that many of the objections against this form of the cultus are wholly unsatisfactory. I have done this not merely in the interests of controversy, but of conciliation, since, if we are to arrive at mutual agreement, or even at mutual understanding, it is most important to get baseless difficulties and differences cleared out of the way. But I have tried throughout the book to make my own conclusions perfectly plain and uncompromising. They are summed up in the first chapter.

3. The theology of the cultus in the eucharist was a *development:* it was not prominent in the early centuries. The cultus of the reserved sacrament and the working out of its theology came later still. These are points on which it is safe to say that there is a general agreement, and I have taken them for granted. Consequently, I have not discussed the historical evidences for the development, and most of my quotations are made from mediæval and modern writers. But I have discussed at some length how far this lateness of development affects the legitimacy and value of the cultus.

4. The point of vital importance seems to me to lie in the question whether the cultus in both its forms harmonizes, or fails to harmonize, with the theological, devotional, and ethical principles of the Faith. I have attempted to bring together all the considerations that touch on this point, so far as the size of the book allows.

5. I must say, in conclusion, that this book started with a triangular correspondence between myself, Mr. Baverstock, and another writer who prefers to remain anonymous. Many of the arguments, both those with which I agree and those with which I differ, are due to their suggestions. This will explain why some of the quotations have no reference after them to any published book, and why others are referred simply to "an Anglican writer."

CONTENTS

PART I

PRELIMINARY POINTS.

CHAPTER		PAGE
I.	AIM OF BOOK	1–19
II.	THE NATURE OF THE SACRAMENTAL PRESENCE	20–24
III.	THEORY OF A LOCAL PRESENCE	25–38
IV.	THE MEANING OF THE CULTUS	39–47

PART II

THE MAIN ARGUMENTS FOR THE CULTUS IN EACH OF ITS TWO FORMS.

V.	THE MAIN ARGUMENTS FOR THE CULTUS OF THE SACRAMENTAL PRESENCE IN THE EUCHARIST	50–56
VI.	THE MAIN ARGUMENTS FOR THE CULTUS OF THE RESERVED SACRAMENT	57–58

PART III

UNSATISFACTORY OBJECTIONS, MOST OF WHICH ARE DIRECTED AGAINST BOTH FORMS OF THE CULTUS ALIKE.

VII.	INTRODUCTORY	60
VIII.	EXPERIENCE AND CONVICTION	61–66
IX.	EXPERIENCE AND CONVICTION (*continued*): THE BALANCE OF LOSS AND GAIN	67–69
X.	EXPERIENCE AND CONVICTION (*continued*): MORAL TENDENCIES	70–75
XI.	THE VISIBLE PRESENCE	76–79

CHAPTER PAGES

XII.—SPIRITUAL ACCESS - - - - - 80–81

XIII.—THE UNIVERSAL AND THE HEAVENLY PRESENCE - 82–86

XIV.—THE UNIVERSAL AND THE HEAVENLY PRESENCE (*continued*) - - - - - 87–90

XV.—THE INDWELLING IMMANENT PRESENCE - - 91–97

XVI.—THE INDWELLING IMMINENT PRESENCE (*continued*) - 98–107

XVII.—WORSHIP IN THE EUCHARIST - - - 108–111

XVIII.—LATE DEVELOPMENT - - - - 112–114

XIX.—LOGIC AND MYSTERY - - - - 115–117

XX.—CONCLUSIONS SUMMARIZED - - - - 118

PART IV

SPECIAL OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE CULTUS OF THE RESERVED SACRAMENT IN PARTICULAR.

XXI.—INTRODUCTORY - - - - - 120

XXII.—UNSATISFACTORY OBJECTIONS TO THE CULTUS OF THE RESERVED SACRAMENT - - 121–130

XXIII.—A FINAL AND VALID OBJECTION: THE CULTUS OF THE RESERVED SACRAMENT IMPAIRS THE BALANCE OF WORSHIP - - - - 131–134

XXIV.—THE FINAL OBJECTION NOT MET: VARIOUS INADEQUATE REPLIES - - - - 135–144

XXV.—GENERAL CONCLUSION - - - 145–146

ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS

PART I

PRELIMINARY POINTS.

I.—AIM OF BOOK.

This book aims at considering the reasons that may be urged for and against the cultus of the sacramental presence, with a special view to the promotion of mutual understanding, even if mutual agreement is impossible.

The objection that discussion is useless without full inquiry into ultimate problems of philosophy and authority does not hold good.

II.—THE NATURE OF THE SACRAMENTAL PRESENCE.

In the sacramental presence the bread and wine are in some sense identified with Christ's body and blood, and so with Christ Himself. The presence is an objective presence, existing prior to reception.

Note (1) criticism of the word "objective" in this connection.

Note (2) theory of a "congregational presence."

III.—THEORY OF A LOCAL PRESENCE.

The theory of a local presence is said to be the basis of the cultus: hence the need of discussing it.

Anglican and Roman accounts given at length. Four conceptions involved in these accounts analyzed and criticized; the most plausible being this: that the presence is localized in a literal, but not in the technical scholastic sense.

Conclusion: The theory is not a safe basis for the cultus, and the cultus can be defended apart from it.

IV.—THE MEANING OF THE CULTUS.

The cultus is defined, not merely as devotion to the sacramental presence, but as the use of it for the purpose, though not mainly for the purpose, of devotion. The word "purpose" in this connection is justifiable.

Note Dr. Weston's objection to the word "use" in this definition.

PART II

THE MAIN ARGUMENTS FOR THE CULTUS IN EACH OF ITS TWO FORMS.

V.—THE MAIN ARGUMENTS FOR THE CULTUS OF THE SACRAMENTAL PRESENCE IN THE EUCHARIST.

(I.) Introductory.

The sacramental presence is an adorable presence and a presence that demands adoration. These assertions rest on the identification of the outward

signs with the body and blood of Christ; they do not involve, as is sometimes alleged, the theory of a local presence.

(II.) Summary of Arguments.

1. The evidence of experience and conviction is in favour of the cultus, the use of the sacramental presence for the purpose, though not mainly for the purpose, of devotion and adoration. This evidence is not conclusive, but it has considerable weight.

2. It is as much a privilege and a duty to be in the sacramental presence and to pay it our devotion, as it was a privilege and a duty for the disciples to be in Christ's visible presence and to adore Him (as St. Thomas did in the upper room).

3 The value of the presence and of the cultus rests on the principle that God brings His personal reality home to us by outward acts of which the Incarnation is the chief, the sacramental presence being an extension of the Incarnation. The sacramental presence helps us to concentrate our thoughts on Christ. It "helps us to say our prayers."

It is a prominent point in this argument that the presence of Christ in the eucharist is *a presence of "Christ in action,"* as contrasted with a presence that can be regarded as passive.

VI.—THE MAIN ARGUMENTS FOR THE CULTUS OF THE RESERVED SACRAMENT.

The arguments for the cultus in the reserved sacrament are, with one significant omission, the same as those for the cultus in the eucharist; they

contain no reference to a presence of Christ "in action."

The question as to whether this omission invalidates the arguments will be considered in the last part of this book.

PART III

UNSATISFACTORY OBJECTIONS, MOST OF WHICH ARE DIRECTED AGAINST BOTH FORMS OF THE CULTUS ALIKE. (SPECIAL OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE CULTUS OF THE RESERVED SACRAMENT IN PARTICULAR ARE CONSIDERED IN THE LAST PART OF THE BOOK.)

VII.—INTRODUCTORY.

The objections dealt with in this part of the book are for the most part equally applicable to the cultus in both its forms. It is true that many of the quotations contained in it were written with special reference to the cultus of the reserved sacrament; but when they are examined they seem to bear on the cultus in the eucharist as well—on the use, that is, of the sacramental presence for the purpose, though not mainly for the purpose, of paying adoration to our Lord.

We work up to the conclusion that these objections are, on the whole, unsatisfactory.

Special objections, as we have said before, against the cultus of the reserved sacrament in particular will be considered later.

VIII.—EXPERIENCE AND CONVICTION.

It is objected that the evidence of experience and conviction is not sufficient to prove the value and

legitimacy of the cultus. Alleged experiences are not always real experiences. Convictions are often mistaken and mutually inconsistent. The sense of gain felt by those who use the cultus is beyond dispute, but it does not follow that the gain is real gain.

Yet the evidence, even though by itself it is inconclusive, has considerable weight.

IX.—EXPERIENCE AND CONVICTION (*Continued*): THE BALANCE OF LOSS AND GAIN.

It is objected that the sense of gain felt in the sacramental presence involves a sense of loss when we are away from it, and that the sense of gain is necessarily outweighed by the sense of loss.

This objection is unsound.

X.—EXPERIENCE AND CONVICTION (*Continued*): MORAL TENDENCIES.

The objection is made that the cultus tends to produce a self-centred, non-social, and emotional type of religion. (The case of "Jesus-worship" considered.)

The reply is, that these tendencies are not necessarily involved in the cultus.

NOTE.—The glory of God, not the deepening of our own devotion for our own sake, is the ultimate end of the cultus.

XI.—THE VISIBLE PRESENCE.

It is objected that the adoration paid to Christ's visible presence on earth is not an argument for the cultus; for since the visible presence was withdrawn it

is presumably not needed, and the kind of adoration that was paid to it is not needed either.

This objection is unsatisfactory as the sacramental presence has *not* been withdrawn.

NOTE 1.—Critics have thrown doubt on the historicity of the incidents in which adoration was paid to the visible presence. But the non-historicity of the incidents does not necessarily affect the argument.

NOTE 2.—The objection considered that incidental adoration only is required by the sacramental presence

XII.—SPIRITUAL ACCESS.

Spiritual means alone, it is said, can bring us into closer relation with Christ.

The reply is that the sacramental presence gives us a presence that demands adoration, and by this means does bring us into closer relation with Christ.

XIII.—THE UNIVERSAL AND THE HEAVENLY PRESENCE.

There is admittedly a presence of Christ as God everywhere, and a presence of Christ as God and Man in heaven. Christ is effectively presented to us in both these modes of His existence, in the sense of being always ready and able to hear and help.

Objectors maintain that this effective presence makes the sacramental presence needless for the purposes of the cultus; the sacramental presence cannot make the effective presence or our relation to it more effective than it is already.

The objection, however, does not meet the arguments already stated—*i.e.*, that the sacramental presence does give us a presence which demands

and kindles devotion and which brings home to us the personal reality of God. In these ways Christ's presence and His relation to us do become more effective, and the cultus is justified.

XIV.—THE UNIVERSAL AND THE HEAVENLY PRESENCE (*Continued*).

The cultus is said to militate against belief in the effectiveness of the non-sacramental external presence of Christ; to involve the notion that absence from the sacramental presence is absence from Christ Himself.

The reply is that, on the contrary, a special sacramental presence bears witness to a permanent effective presence of Christ.

NOTE.—This objection against the cultus is said to be analogous with the hostility of the prophets to local foci of worship. The analogy however, does not hold good.

XV.—THE INDWELLING IMMANENT PRESENCE.

The objection is made that the indwelling immanent presence of Christ makes the cultus (the use of the external presence for the purpose of devotion) needless; and conversely, that the cultus militates necessarily against belief in the indwelling presence.

We reply:

(*a*) Immanence and transcendence are complementary truths. (*b*) The objection proves too much. If the immanent presence is all-sufficient, it makes unnecessary, not only the sacramental presence, but the external transcendent presence in any form.

But Christ as an object of worship must be regarded as external and transcendent, and the sacramental presence brings home to us this transcendence. (*c*) The heavenly worship involves both forms of Christ's presence.

NOTE.—The heavenly worship and the symbolism of the Apocalypse.

XVI.—THE INDWELLING PRESENCE (*Continued*).

According to opponents of the cultus, defenders do, as a matter of fact, disbelieve in or ignore the permanent indwelling presence. This is conspicuously the case with Roman writers, who hold that the presence given in communion is a temporary visit only.

The reply is:

1. The objection goes too far. Many defenders of the cultus strenuously maintain their belief in the permanent indwelling presence, and impute this same belief to Roman writers also. The Roman view that the sacramental presence is temporary does not involve disbelief in a permanent non-sacramental presence.

2. The objection, however, does in some degree apply to modern Roman writers whose explanations of the permanent indwelling presence are ambiguous.

3. Conclusion: The objection is stated too unguardedly; in any case, as the last chapter showed, the cultus does not *involve necessarily* any disbelief in or ignoring of the permanent indwelling presence.

XVII.—WORSHIP IN THE EUCHARIST.

It is urged that in the eucharist adoration is to be addressed only incidentally to Christ and His sacramental presence; and that the Father, or rather the Trinity, is the primary end of worship. The reply is, that in the eucharist we worship the Father in, and not merely through, the Son. Primary aims do not exclude subordinate aims.

XVIII.—LATE DEVELOPMENT.

Consideration of the argument that the late development of the cultus, and its connection with false views of the presence, militate against its legitimacy.

XIX.—LOGIC AND MYSTERY

It is objected that the mysterious nature of the sacramental presence and the fallibility of logic make inferences as to the use of the sacramental presence precarious.

The reply is that the " absolute mystery " theory of the presence would remove it from the sphere even of faith; and that those who urge the fallibility of logic are inconsistent in the way they use it themselves. Each case in which logic is used must be considered on its merits.

XX.—CONCLUSIONS SUMMARIZED.

1. As to the cultus in the eucharist, the arguments put forward in its favour are valid; the objections made against it are unsatisfactory. Its legitimacy and value have been vindicated.

2. As to the cultus of the reserved sacrament, here again the objections so far brought against it (objec-

tions directed at the same time against the cultus in the eucharist) have proved unsatisfactory. But we have still to consider special objections against this form of the cultus, some of which are unconvincing, while others appear to have great weight, even if they are not absolutely conclusive.

PART IV

SPECIAL OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE CULTUS OF THE RESERVED SACRAMENT IN PARTICULAR.

XXI.—INTRODUCTORY.

XXII.—UNSATISFACTORY OBJECTIONS TO THE CULTUS OF THE RESERVED SACRAMENT.

In this chapter we deal with the following objections: (1) Late development. (2) Alleged uncertainty of a permanent presence apart from its use for the purpose for which it was given, *i.e.* for communion. (3) The charge that the cultus of the reserved sacrament militates against frequent communion. (4) The assertion that the cultus tends to a self-centred and anti-social attitude. (5) The accusation that the cultus is the direct result of the doctrine of transubstantiation.

None of these objections are convincing.

XXIII.—A FINAL AND VALID OBJECTION TO THE CULTUS OF THE RESERVED SACRAMENT: IT IMPAIRS THE BALANCE OF WORSHIP.

We arrive at the last, and, as it appears, a valid objection to the cultus of the reserved sacrament.

It takes this form: The presence in the reserved sacrament is not, like the presence in the eucharist, "a presence of Christ in action." It is a passive presence, cut off from Christ's living and active relations with the Father and with us. The cultus, therefore, of the reserved sacrament cannot be grounded on the arguments which vindicate the cultus in the eucharist. It throws a disproportionate emphasis on an external and passive presence, and thus disturbs the balance of true worship.

XXIV.—THE FINAL OBJECTION NOT MET: VARIOUS INADEQUATE REPLIES.

This objection has, to say the least, considerable force. It is not adequately met by referring to "the evidence of experience and conviction"—on which defenders of the cultus lay great stress, nor by various other rejoinders which we consider in this chapter.

XXV.—CONCLUSIONS SUMMARIZED.

1. *We arrive at the conclusion that, although the cultus of the sacramental presence in the eucharist is valid, and although many of the arguments urged against the cultus of the reserved sacrament are unsatisfactory, yet the objection that it impairs the balance of worship makes its legitimacy and value at the least doubtful.*

2. *The second aim of the book re-stated: mutual comprehension, if agreement is found impossible.*

PART I

PRELIMINARY POINTS.

I.—Aim of Book stated.
II.—[illegible]
III.—Theory of a Local Presence.
IV.—The Meaning of "The Celtic."

CHAPTER I.

AIM OF BOOK.

This book aims at considering the reasons that can be urged for and against the cultus of the sacramental presence, with a special view to the promotion of mutual understanding even if mutual agreement is impossible The objection that discussion is useless without full inquiry into ultimate problems of philosophy and authority does not hold good.

I.

The first aim of this book, as the foregoing summary implies, is to provide a defence of the " cultus " of the sacramental presence in the eucharist, and a criticism of the " cultus " of the reserved sacrament.

It is important to get this aim clear from the very beginning, and perhaps the best way of doing so is to give a short outline of the course of the argument, showing the conclusions reached, and the way we work up to them.

In Part I we discuss the meaning of the terms " sacramental presence " and " cultus."

(*a*) We accept the view of the sacramental presence which regards it as a *real* presence, and which considers that the bread and wine are in some sense *identified* with the body and blood of Christ.

(*b*) We define the "cultus" not merely as devotion paid to the presence *incidentally*, but as the systematic use of that presence for the *purpose* (though *not mainly* for the purpose) of devotion.

We note that the cultus has *two forms* according as devotion is paid to the presence in the eucharist or to the presence in the reserved sacrament.

In PART II we state the main arguments:

(*a*) For the cultus of the sacramental presence in the eucharist.

(*b*) For the cultus of the sacramental presence in the reserved sacrament.

We note that these arguments are the same with one important exception: the argument based on the presence in the eucharist being a presence of Christ *in action* does not apply to the cultus of the reserved sacrament. This point, as we see later, makes a difference to our final conclusion.

In PART III we review the chief objections that can be brought against the cultus in *both* its forms, leaving over those that have a *special* application to the cultus of the reserved sacrament. We try to show that all these objections are unsatisfactory.

In PART IV we consider the *special* objections which can be urged against the cultus of the reserved sacrament in particular—objections that do not apply to the cultus in the eucharist.

(*a*) We discuss, first, some unsatisfactory objections to the cultus of the reserved sacrament.

(*b*) We discuss, secondly, a final and, as it seems to us, a valid objection to this form of the cultus.

(*c*) We discuss, thirdly, some unsuccessful attempt to set this valid objection on one side.

We reach in this way the general conclusion—

(*a*) That the cultus of the sacramental presence in the eucharist is legitimate and has real value in the Christian life.

(*b*) That the cultus of the reserved sacrament, although many of the objections brought against it will not bear criticism, is nevertheless on the whole illegitimate and undesirable.

II.

In the second place this book is interested, not only, and perhaps not chiefly, in arriving at a definite conclusion, but in promoting mutual understanding between those who are at present disagreed. As matters stand, theological controversies in general, and this controversy in particular, often run on unsatisfactory lines. The same arguments are brought forward over and over again in book after book, journal after journal, and especially in newspaper correspondence, without reference to the answers with which they have repeatedly been met. No thinker can rightly complain that his opponents disagree with him; but he has a right to complain if his opponents will not take any notice of his case. Controversy is therefore necessary. We cannot substitute for it what is known as "the method of constructive theology," the working out of our own theories without interfering with the theories of other people. That method has great value, but it cannot stand alone. The manœuvres of antagonists who sail away from each other into a fog of their own making result in nothing, not even in conciliation. It is useless to avoid conflict if at the same

time we avoid contact. There is no reason why controversy carried on conscientiously should be barren of result. If we find out that our differences are irreconcilable, even so our time is not wasted; we have found out where precisely the irreconcilability lies. If, on the other hand, we find, as we probably shall, that many of our differences rest on misunderstandings, then, though we have not reached a conclusion, it is a gain to have cleared a few of these misunderstandings out of the way. As it is, we seem condemned to the eternal repetition of the first moves of the game, instead of being like professional chess players who really begin the game when the recognized openings are completed.

III.

We are met at the outset by a difficulty. "The problem of the cultus," it has been said with great emphasis, "involves at every turn fundamental and ultimate problems of history, of metaphysics, and of authority, whether of the church or of the bible. It cannot be usefully discussed unless there is agreement on these problems. Such agreement does not exist, and in a short book the problems cannot even be examined."

This difficulty seems to be exaggerated.

(*a*) It proves too much. It condemns implicitly almost every theological book in existence, for in all of them these same problems are more or less involved. Yet we do not expect all such books to nter into these principles in great detail, nor do we on this account discard them as useless.

(*b*) Secondly, even if you can throw light on one aspect of the subject only, you have done something that is worth doing. Now the most rigid authoritarian in discussing the cultus deals with the question of its *value ;* he tries to show in what way it meets human needs. Again, he tries to show in what way it is in harmony with the facts and principles of the faith on which he and his opponents are agreed. These are certainly aspects of the case which must be discussed, and they do not necessarily involve us in ultimate problems of history, metaphysics and authority.

Even when such ultimate problems are really involved, it is extremely important to see where and how far they are involved. And that can only be done by seeing how far we can carry on the discussion without them.

(*c*) Church authority does not come into the discussion so much as the objector thinks. Roman Catholics are, of course, bound by decrees of their Councils in which the nature of the sacramental presence and the duties of the cultus are defined. Anglicans, however, except the minority who consider themselves more or less committed to the acceptance of Roman theology, do not think themselves bound by such decrees; and the same assertion holds good of the orthodox East. The Church in their view has said nothing authoritatively which settles the problems of the cultus. They are free, therefore, to argue the problem on its merits. Even Roman Catholics leave the question of authority on one side when certain aspects of the subject, *e.g.* the value of the cultus, are under discussion.

(*d*) There are some minor points on which the theory of authority may make a difference. Thus the worship described in the Apocalypse has been pressed into the argument, and so has the mention in the Old Testament of the Shekinah. In both cases a rigoristic view of inspiration may colour our conclusions. But these points (to which we recur later) are minor points after all, and no one rests his case on them.

(*e*) These remarks about authority apply very much as they stand to questions of philosophy and history. The theories, for instance, of transubstantiation and of a local presence are in some measure philosophical, and they crop up in the discussion of the cultus. But we shall see that the cultus does not really depend on them.

CHAPTER II.

THE NATURE OF THE SACRAMENTAL PRESENCE.

There is a fairly general agreement that in the sacramental presence the bread and wine are in some sense identified with the body and blood of Christ, and so with Christ Himself. The presence is an objective presence, existing prior to reception. NOTE 1.—*Criticism of the word "objective" in this connection.* NOTE 2.—*Theory of a "congregational presence."*

As the cultus is directed towards the sacramental presence we must try to reach some sort of a definition, so far as it is required for the purpose of the discussion, of the sense in which this phrase is used. There are some thinkers who demur to the demand for definitions. "We know," they may say, "the *fact* of the presence; its *mode* is a matter of indifference, a matter on which certainty is impossible." Yet it seems obvious that, if we are to know anything of what our attitude ought or ought not to be towards the sacramental presence, we must also know what we mean by that presence; and we can make no sharp distinction, as we shall see later, between its meaning, its definition, and its mode.

Among those who believe in the sacramental

presence there seems to be a fairly general agreement on the following points:

(*a*) The bread and the wine are in some sense identified with the body and blood of Christ, and so with Christ Himself.

(*b*) The presence, consequently, is an objective or real presence.

(*c*) It is a presence that exists prior to reception.

These points are generally accepted both by Roman Catholics, and also by Anglicans who make a point of maintaining the Catholic traditions of the Church. Dr. Gore's account may be taken as typical:

(There is) "an objectively real presence in the eucharist. . . . This phrase might express equally well the reality of the spiritual grace imparted in baptism. For that, too, is objective; in the sense that it is not the product of the receiver's mind. . . . In this sense all who are sacramental believers would admit the gift in the Holy Eucharist to be objective. . . . The word, however, is generally used in a further sense in which it is not applicable to baptism: and its use in this sense is so valuable for purposes of distinction that it had better be retained. It expresses the belief that prior to reception, and independently of the faith of the individual, the body and blood of Christ are made 'present' under the forms of bread and wine, or in some real though undefined way identified with them" (*Body of Christ*, pp. 73, 74).

(And again) "I do not think it disputable that the Church did, as a whole, from the beginning, believe that the eucharistic elements themselves in some real sense . . . became, prior to reception, the body and blood of the living and glorified Christ, inseparable from the living person of Christ Himself" (*Ibid.*, p. 94).

Dr. Gore explains in another place that although some of the Fathers speak as though in baptism the water itself were transformed, expressions of this kind are not frequent, and must be taken metaphorically. The water was never treated with the reverence habitually shown to the consecrated bread and wine.

The same doctrine of a real and objective presence is formulated by the Council of Trent:

"After the consecration of the bread and wine, our Lord Jesus Christ, God and Man, is truly, really, and substantially contained under the species of these sensible things" (Session XIII., cap. 1).

The Council also speaks of Christ being "sacramentally present" in the eucharist.

Roman writers maintain as well an identification of the Lord's body, if not with the bread and wine (which on their view no longer remain), yet with the sacramental species. Thus the Bishop of Newport (Hedley) says:

"Catholics speak truly when they say of a consecrated Host that 'It' is the Body of our Lord. . . . The Body of our Lord . . . has taken the place of the substance of the bread, has adopted the bread's qualities. This makes it possible to say with truth that the Host *is* the Lord's Body, and justifies the worshippers in adoring" (*The Holy Eucharist*, p. 65).

In all these accounts we find a general agreement as to the objective reality of the real presence. This view of the presence may be accompanied by, but does not involve, the Roman theory of transubstantiation, a theory which is unacceptable to the majority of Anglicans.

NOTE 1.—The contrast drawn above between the terms *objective* and *subjective* has been criticized by Father Waggett, both on philosophical grounds and on the grounds of common usage. He says:

"The presence must be both. (Philosophically) there can be no subjective expression of that which is not ourselves without an objective correlative; (while conversely) every objective presence must have a subjective correlative. (Again) in common language, the alternative appears to be misleading . . . . The presence is certainly not objective if by objective we mean an object of sense, . . . and this is the usual meaning of objective."

Father Waggett, however, agrees that "the presence is objective in the sense of being independent, of being no creation of the mind" (of the individual); and this seems to be the sense attached to the word by Bishop Gore and indeed, in spite of what Father Waggett tells us, by ordinary people.

So far as we have gone, we have been involved in none of those disagreements as to ultimate principles which, as objectors say, make controversy unprofitable. The differences we have noticed—*e.g.*, those relating to the problem of transubstantiation—do not vitally affect the problem of the cultus.

NOTE 2.—The following theory of what has been called a "congregational presence" is held by some writers who repudiate the idea of a sacramental presence. The account of it given by Dr. Moule at the Fulham Round Table Conference has been often quoted:

(There is) "a special presence," "a congregational presence" of Christ in the Holy Communion, "given in accordance with the promise, 'where two or three are gathered together in My Name, there am I in the midst of them.'" (It is a presence) "mystical in mode, but true in fact," . . . "no creation of our imagination, but an object for our faith. . . . If our eyes were opened, we should see our Lord present, not on the Table, but at it. . . . I believe that we should worship Him thus present."

It might plausibly be suggested that this "congregational presence" could serve as a basis for the cultus even in the case of those who have no belief in a presence of a sacramental kind. If Christ is really present in this external way, it is fit and proper to use His presence for the purposes of devotion.

The suggestion has, perhaps, a certain speculative interest; but it does not lie within the scope of this discussion to follow it up in detail. We assume throughout that the theory of the real presence, as described in the earlier portion of this chapter, is substantially correct.

CHAPTER III.

THEORY OF A LOCAL PRESENCE.

The theory of a local presence is sometimes said to be the basis of the cultus; hence the need of discussing it. Anglican and Roman accounts given at length. Four conceptions involved in these accounts analyzed and criticized; the most plausible being this: that the presence is localized in a literal, but not in the technical scholastic, sense.

Conclusion: The theory is not a safe basis for the cultus, and the cultus can be defended apart from it.

We begin with an extract from Dr. Strong:

"The adoration of Christ present in the sacramental elements, (and) the practice of visiting the Blessed Sacrament reserved in churches . . . are all based upon a belief in a local Presence" (*Doctrine of the Real Presence*, pp. 92, 93).

Now it is quite true that many defenders of the cultus lay great stress on the theory that the presence is in some sense local, and to this theory Roman writers seem committed. But even if, as they may think, a local presence involves the cultus, it does not at all follow that the cultus involves a local presence. There are reasons, as we shall see, for believing that the cultus can be defended on other grounds.

But in any case, as much attention has been called to this theory, and as it is so frequently misunderstood, it seems best to consider at some length what it really is, and the objections that may be brought against it.

I.—The Theory as Explained by its Defenders.

In order to do justice to the theory we must take into account the way in which it is expressed by those who hold it. Special attention is due to the quotations from Roman Catholic writers. It is by them that the theory of the cultus in its modern form, and of the local presence, have been worked out, worked over, and, in great measure, stereotyped.

We begin with a passage from Cardinal Newman which is frequently quoted by Anglican writers as containing at first sight a flat denial of the theory of the local presence. Whether the interpretation they put on his words is correct or not is another matter, on which we may be able to form an opinion when the problem has been more fully discussed. Newman's words are:

"Our Lord is *in loco* in heaven, not in the same sense in the sacrament. He is present in the sacrament only in substance, . . . and substance does not imply the occupation of place. If place is excluded from the idea of the sacramental presence, . . . distance from heaven is excluded also . . . (and so is) the idea of motion. The visible species change their position, but He does not move. His presence is . . . spirit-wise, sacramental; an absolute mystery, not against reason, but against imagination" (*Via Media*, vol. ii., p. 220).

Mr. Baverstock, a defender of the cultus, writes, so it might seem at first sight, to the opposite effect:

"The soul is where the body is, and not at the same time elsewhere. But the Sacred Humanity of our Lord is really and literally present whole and entire in every consecrated particle. All Catholic theology proclaims the presence in the Blessed Sacrament as one of locality. To call it 'supra-local' is to deny its extension, but not its relation, through the species, to a definite point of space. In the phrase 'the real presence,' the word 'presence' is meaningless if not used in what Hooker calls its 'proper' sense, *i.e.*, of position."

In another place he explains the point on similar lines:

"Our Lord is as truly present in the tabernacle and on the altar of the Church as He was present in Galilee or Jerusalem; as truly present as He is present in heaven. . . . In heaven, and there only, (Christ) is *locally* present. . . . His sacramental presence. . . . is spiritual and *supra-local*. Yet it is conditioned by space. Our Lord is actually and substantially present *there* where the Blessed Sacrament is, as He is present in His Manhood nowhere else, save in heaven. For while, as God, our Lord is present everywhere, His Manhood is circumscribed in its presence. This was laid down by the Council of Nicæa, and the Lutheran doctrine of the ubiquity of the Sacred Manhood is rightly condemned as heresy" (*English Church Review*, p. 165, 1918).

(Again, there is) "a Presence of Christ in a certain spot (on the altar or in the tabernacle) to be approached by bodily progression" (*ibid.*, p. 168).

It is alleged against Roman writers, and against Anglicans who on this point agree with them, that

they alternate inconsistently between the affirmation and the blank denial of a local presence; that they affirm it for devotional purposes in the interests of the cultus, and deny it when they want to escape from its materialistic implications. It is a contradiction to say that Christ's "presence" in the eucharist is to be taken "in its 'proper' sense of position," and to say at the same time that He "exists locally in heaven only."

It seems as though we were being urged to accept the phrase "a spatial presence," while we reject all that the phrase is ordinarily taken to imply.

It is suggested, on the other hand, that our difficulty really rests on our ignorance of scholastic doctrine and terminology, and that if we took the trouble to understand them, we should see that the charge of inconsistency falls to the ground.

It is quite true that the scholastic point of view is not generally familiar, and that the Roman position is largely based upon it. In order, therefore, to make it as clear as possible we give a series of quotations from recent Roman books in which the theory is explained for modern readers, reserving our criticisms until these writers have been allowed to speak for themselves.

Père Hugon, in his *La Sainte Eucharistie* (1918), begins by quoting a well-known passage from St. Thomas (III., Q. 76, A. 4), a passage which is translated by Dr. Gore in his *Body of Christ* (p. 297) as follows:

"The body of our Saviour is not, properly speaking, localized in the Eucharist as in a place; but we

can say that, in a sense, it is in the place of the sacramental species, because it is really present where the consecrated species are."

Localization (we abbreviate Père Hugon's explanation) in the proper sense may be of two kinds: the first is in the manner of "circumscribed" bodies with corporal dimension. Such bodies are contained in a place (as, *e.g.*, water in a glass). The second kind of localization is that of "*la présence seulement définitive*," like that of the soul in the body, a presence which is limited to one place at a time. The body of Christ in the eucharist is not localized in either of these ways. It is not extended, and it is not confined to one place, but is present wherever we find the consecrated species (pp. 174, 175).

Père Hugon continues:

"Yet in some sense the body of Christ is certainly in place, as the language of the councils declares."

Thus the Council of Trent (Session XIII., c, 1, tr. in *Body of Christ*, p. 297) says:

"Christ is in heaven according to the natural mode of existence, . . . nevertheless, He is, in many other places, sacramentally present to us by a mode of existing which, though we can scarcely express it in words, yet can we by the understanding illuminated by faith conceive, and we ought most firmly believe to be possible with God."

Père Hugon adds:

"The supernatural reality transcending our poor language, we ought to content ourselves with saying

that it is a sacramental presence of which there is not any other example in the whole created universe, and which is '*une invention admirable de notre Dieu d'amour*' " (p. 176).

As to the question of movement he says:

" Since the body is not directly in place, it is not subject of itself to local movement; but, as it is in place '*par l'intermédiaire des accidents eucharistiques*,' it does change from place to place with the sacramental species. We can say, then, quite truly, that the body of Jesus Christ is lifted, transferred, or carried, in procession," etc. (p. 177).

The following passages are taken from *The Holy Eucharist* by the Bishop of Newport. His explanation of the theory runs over some five pages, and is here considerably condensed.

" It is easy to see in what sense (the Sacred Body) is in ' place ' or ' localized ' in the eucharist.

" It cannot be said to be ' in place ' in the proper or circumscriptive use of that term. A spirit may be said to be in ' place ' (as when we say that an angel dwells in human form). But as a spirit has no parts or dimensions by which it can come into contact with natural boundaries, we mean that it operates within such boundaries, or is ' there,' by there exercising its power.

" On the other hand, material substances . . . are said to be in ' place ' because they touch the bodies that respectively bound them (as a stone is contained by the clay in which it is embedded). This is what is meant by localization, literally and properly." [This is not quite consistent with Père Hugon's terminology which applies localization to *definitive presence* also.]

" Our Lord's Body is not a spirit; and although

it is truly said to be in the eucharist after the manner of a spirit, yet the statement is an analogy only. It is in place after the manner of a material substance, deprived of actual dimensions—of a substance, therefore, that has no points of contact with any material surroundings; a substance of which place, in its formal sense, cannot be predicated.

"Therefore it can be in many places at once; because the truth is, that it is (properly) in none of them. It cannot be moved from one place to another; because it is in no place to begin with. It is wholly in every particle of the species—but in a way quite special to the Holy Eucharist, viz., as substance with no dimensive relation (pp. 53, 54).

"There is nothing intrinsically contradictory in saying that material substances can be deprived of actual dimension. . . . All that we are actually concerned with is to see that such conceptions are not contradictory. This we can see (p. 55).

"At the same time the instinct of the faithful persists in speaking of the Sacred Body as 'present' on the altar or in the tabernacle, and as capable of being moved and carried from place to place; and the language of the Church altogether authorizes this way of speaking. Our Lord's Body is rightly said to be moved *per accidens;* that is, it is not literally moved, but on account of something else being moved, it receives new relations to certain extrinsic objects. . . .

"If an angel dwelt in a material sphere, the sphere might be moved, but not the angel; . . . he is out of the possibility of local motion. But if the sphere moved, say from London to Paris, the angel would be moved *per accidens; i.e.*, his power would be exercised now with certain relations to Paris, whilst hitherto it had been exercised with certain relations to London.

"It is somewhat in this manner that it is true to

say that the Body of Christ is 'moved' in the eucharist.

"The Lord's Body takes up a special and most intimate connection with the species. The species belong to the Body like a containing condition, . . . a vehicle of divine effect. Thus they impart their 'locality' to the unlocalized Body of Christ. When they are moved . . . He is said to be moved" (pp. 56, 57).

"We adore the Host because it *is* our Lord; and as it is He, and as the species He has chosen to adopt are in that place and not in other places, we rightly say, though not in the strict sense, that He is there, in the tabernacle, . . . in the priest's hands, where the Host or Chalice is" (p. 260).

II.—Criticisms.

We cannot admit after reading these quotations that it is "easy to see" in what sense the presence of Christ is in place or localized or moved. When we examine them, we find ourselves confronted with several more or less distinct theories, each of which is open to objection, and which are not altogether consistent with each other.

1. We are told that the sacramental presence of Christ is difficult to define, and that it is "unlike anything else in the universe."

If this means that the *object* which is present is unlike anything else in the universe, there is no objection to be made to the statement. But if it is meant that the *presence quâ presence* is unlike every other kind of presence, then the statement seems unsatisfactory. To speak of a presence—of a spatial relation (for that is what the word "presence" implies)—which is unlike every other

kind of spatial relation known to us, conveys no positive meaning to the mind. It is not by any means enough that, as the Bishop of Newport suggests, statements should not contradict each other; they must have some intelligible content, otherwise they offer nothing of which reason or faith can get a grasp.

2. Again, we are told that "localization" in the "proper" sense of the term is applied to circumscribed extended objects (*e.g.*, to water in a glass), and (perhaps) also to unextended objects that can only occupy at the same time one single "definitive position" (*e.g.*, to the soul in a man's body). In the "proper" sense, therefore, it is obvious that the sacramental presence is not localized, since it is not an extended object, and it may exist on a thousand altars at once.

If we accept the premisses, the conclusion is undeniable. It is of course a negative conclusion, but so far as it goes it is at least clear and uncompromising. The question as to whether we *can* accept the premisses remains to be discussed.

3. We come next to what, if we may coin a term, we may call the theory of "the instrumental presence." The term seems to fit the detailed explanations given by the Bishop of Newport and by the other authorities whom we have quoted. On this theory the *presence* is not localized in the proper sense, but the *host* is localized, and Christ uses it as the instrument or "vehicle" of His operation. He does not move when the host moves, but the "sphere of His operation" is changed. "Catholic instinct" is therefore said to be right in using

language in which localization and motion are implied.

But this explanation proves too much. If we accepted it, we should have to infer that there is a local presence of Christ in, say, baptism, since Christ works through the water, using it as the instrument or "vehicle" of His operation. It would imply also that Christ could rightly be said to move when a priest goes from one church to another to administer baptism in each. But "Catholic instinct" does not lead men to speak of, still less to lay stress on, the idea of a local presence in baptism. (It may be rejoined that Christ is related to the host permanently, whereas in baptism He only works through the water at the moment that it is applied to the person baptized. This is true, but it does not affect the argument. The fact remains that in both cases Christ is using material local objects as the instrument of His operation, and is therefore, on the Bishop's theory, "present" in them.)

The same criticism may be brought out in another way. There is a "mystical" presence in the heart of the faithful, which is an instrumental presence at the same time; Christ works, not only through sacraments, but through men, through saints and martyrs and ordinary Christians. We are in Him, and He is in us. He uses us as His instruments. Now, since we are in space, this mystical presence ought, on the theory in question, to be a local presence as much as is the presence in the host, or the "presence" in the water of baptism. Yet the language of localization is never applied to it; it is, as Mr. Baverstock says, a presence that *transcends* space.

This theory, then (whether we are right or not in calling it the theory of an instrumental presence), is unsatisfactory; it does not justify the language of localization.

4. We are led, in consequence, to a fourth theory which may be stated as follows: The sacramental presence is not a local presence in the "proper," scholastic, technical sense, but it is strictly and literally a local presence in the ordinary sense in which the term is, and has always been taken by ordinary people, and by, perhaps, a majority of non-scholastic philosophers.

This theory is plausible. It can be defended by three lines of argument.

(*a*) It is not put forward explicitly by the Roman writers quoted above, but it does not contradict what they say; it seems to be involved in their conclusions when taken as a whole; and it justifies the language of localization. It is supported by the following extracts from Father Richardson's *What are the Catholic Claims?* (We give them in an abbreviated form):

"Anglicans quote triumphantly the words of St. Thomas: 'In no manner is the Body of Christ in this Sacrament locally.' . . . His aim is to show that Christ's Body is present under the species after the manner of a pure 'substance,' *after the manner* of the presence of the soul in the body." (He gives next an extract from St. Thomas explaining 'local presence' in the technical sense we have described, and then adds): "The mode of the Presence is said to be '*non-localiter*,' simply because the Saint denies this term to the presence of a *substance* (in the scholastic sense of that word); *but should we in the English of to-day say that the presence of the*

substance of a piece of bread was not a local presence?" (P. 155. The italics in the last sentence are ours.)

Again:

"Dr. Gore has entirely misunderstood the words of Cardinal Newman. 'Our Lord's Body is not *in loco* in the sacred species, in the sense that one body (in its ordinary state) is said to be *in loco* in another body; . . . but this 'substantial' presence (of our Lord), although the presence of a body and not of a spirit, is (as Cardinal Newman says), 'spirit-wise.' . . . This is, of course, the mystery, but although beyond, it is not contrary to reason, for, as the Cardinal says elsewhere, we know nothing of the nature of pure substance. But for all that, the presence of our Lord *is truly a 'local' presence, according to the meaning of that word in English, viz., 'restricted to place.'*" (P. 44. Italics ours.)

Father Richardson then may be taken as endorsing this theory of a literally local presence, in the ordinary sense of the words.

(*b*) The theory harmonizes with ordinary language (as Father Richardson has just pointed out). A mathematical point is not "circumscribed"; as Euclid says, it has "no parts or magnitude"; but we do not, on that account, deny it local position in a literal sense. Why, then, should we deny that the sacramental presence is localized in a literal sense in spite of its being, like a mathematical point, unextended? Again, although the sacramental presence is not (like a man's soul) localized in "a single definitive position," it *is* localized in a number of definitive *positions*. It would seem arbitrary to deny that this is literal, even though it may not be "proper," *i.e.*, scholastic, localization.

(*c*) Thirdly, if, as Romans and many Anglicans are agreed, the host is in some sense really *identified* with the body of Christ, and so with Christ Himself, His presence is a localized presence, and it moves as the host moves.

The fact that the body of Christ is spiritual and not extended makes no difference to this argument. A man's mind or "soul" is not extended, and it cannot be said to be located at any particular point in his body. Yet it certainly exists where his body is, and not elsewhere; and it is therefore spatially related to his body. If you come nearer to his body, you come nearer to his mind at the same time. Similarly in coming spatially nearer to the sacramental presence you come spatially nearer Christ. This conclusion may be held quite independently of the doctrine of transubstantiation.

But this theory, in spite of its plausibility, is, like the others, open to criticism.

A man's mind, we may urge, is not in any way spatially related to his body, although it works through his body. To say that in coming spatially nearer to his body you come spatially nearer his mind is meaningless, for his mind has nothing to do with the category of space. It may be related to spatial objects, but the relation it bears to those spatial objects is not itself a relation of a spatial kind. Similarly with regard to the sacramental presence. Christ is related to the outward signs, but He is not related to them spatially, and in coming nearer to them we do not come spatially nearer to Him.

This philosophical objection, so the critic thinks, is backed up by the language of the ancient liturgies.

"Nothing," says an Anglican writer, "is more real than the presence of our Lord's glorified humanity, vouchsafed to us in the eucharist. The (early liturgies) speak of the elements becoming the Body and Blood of Christ—of the Lord coming down to us. But they also speak of their being translated to the heavenly altar; they and we rise to Him. The fact that both ways of expression are employed shows that neither is to be spatially understood."

NOTE.—Another possible argument for a local presence may be noted in passing. Dr. Gore (who strenuously opposes this theory) discusses in his *Religion of the Church* St. Paul's teaching about a spiritual body, and says that he leads us to think of it as "still material, but sublimated, (so that it becomes) the perfect instrument of the spiritual will." Canon Streeter has put forward a theory of a similar kind in his *Essays on Immortality*. Now, if it is true that the glorified body of Christ is in some sense a material body, we can hardly deny that it is subject to spatial relations. Nor can we deny that what is true of His glorified body in general may be true of the sacramental presence of that same body in the eucharist. On Dr. Gore's own showing the sacramental presence will be a material and a localized presence.

III.—CONCLUSION.

The theory of a local presence is, on the whole, too difficult and doubtful to serve as a firm basis for the cultus. We have at last run up into one of those "ultimate philosophical questions that it would take a treatise to discuss, and on which no agreement is to be expected." But this is no reason for dropping the whole discussion in despair. For, as we have said, it is possible to defend the cultus on other grounds.

CHAPTER IV.

THE MEANING OF THE CULTUS.

The cultus defined. Not merely devotion to the sacramental presence, but the use of it for the purpose, though not mainly for the purpose, of devotion. The word "purpose" is justifiable.

Note *Dr. Weston's objection to the word "use" in this definition.*

THERE is no authoritative or generally accepted definition of the cultus; but the sense in which the phrase is usually taken, and which it bears in this book, may be summed up in the following alternative definitions:

(*a*) The cultus of the sacramental presence is the payment to it of systematic devotion and adoration.

(*b*) [Or, as we shall see, more adequately.]

The cultus is the systematic use of the sacramental presence for the purpose (although not mainly for the purpose), of devotion and adoration.

(*c*) We may add as a corollary (though it is not strictly a part of the definition): The cultus involves two beliefs—first a belief in the sacramental presence as an adorable presence, and as, further, a presence that *demands* adoration; secondly, a belief that the purpose of devotion and adoration is one purpose, though not the main purpose, for which the sacramental presence is given.

We must now consider this definition point by point, and the objections that may be made against it.

1. The phrase "an adorable presence" is by itself insufficient to express all that those who use the cultus believe. It needs, in addition, the phrase, "a presence that demands adoration."

There is, admittedly, such a thing as a non-sacramental presence of Christ—*e.g.*, his presence, as God, everywhere. Now, we are always in this universal presence of Christ, and it is an adorable presence. There is no place or time when it is unfitting for us to lift up our hearts to that presence in silent praise. But although Christ is thus in a sense always present and always adorable, it does not follow that we ought always to be engaged in such adoration. If, however, Christ were to come into our room in visible form, we should feel that some token of homage was necessary. There is, therefore, a real distinction between a presence in which adoration is permissible and fitting, and a presence in which adoration is demanded. The sacramental presence (so most of those who believe in the sacramental presence at all will say) is a presence of the latter kind. Even those who disparage the cultus adore when they approach the sacramental presence, not only in the eucharist, but in the tabernacle, though they may think it ought not to be where it is. It seems at first sight obvious that this should be the case. If the sacramental presence is a real presence of Christ, adoration cannot be withheld. Yet we must notice in passing that what may seem obvious to us is not obvious to everyone. Some writers maintain that

this view was not held unanimously in the past. In the first centuries the evidence for it is, they think, ambiguous. Again, in our own times, some of those who have the fullest belief in the sacramental presence do not adore it at all times and in all circumstances. This is the case with some Anglicans, and, as regards the reserved sacrament with the majority of orthodox Easterns. We come back to this point later.

The Roman view, at any rate, is quite uncompromising. It is emphatically expressed by the Council of Trent:

"If any one saith that . . . in the Eucharist . . . Christ . . . is not to be adored with the worship, and with the outward worship also, of *latria ;* and is, consequently, . . . not to be borne in solemn procession . . . or not to be set up before the people to be adored; . . . let him be anathema" (Session XIII., Can. vi., tr. in *The Holy Eucharist*, p. 258).

2. Adoration, if it is one of the purposes for which we use the sacramental presence, and for which the sacramental presence is given us, is not the *main* purpose. That main purpose is for communion and for sacrifice. We need not dwell on this point, as it is one on which there is a general agreement among those who believe in the sacramental presence, whether they defend the cultus or oppose it.

3. The cultus, we have said, is systematic devotion to the sacramental presence. In the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* "cult" is defined as (*a*) "a system of religious worship," or (*b*) "homage to a person or thing." Now, the latter definition, "homage to a person or thing," seems by itself inadequate. I may,

for instance, pay homage, or some tribute of respect, to the King if he passes me accidentally in the street once in a lifetime, but an isolated act of homage like this can hardly be called a cult of the King's person. Before devotion can amount to a cult it must be systematic, as the first definition in the dictionary suggests. The cult we are considering, therefore, is at the least systematic devotion to the sacramental presence.

4. The cult is the systematic use of the sacramental presence for the purpose of devotion (though not mainly for that purpose), and devotion is the purpose (though a subordinate purpose) for which the sacramental presence is given us

To say simply that the cultus is "systematic devotion to the sacramental presence" falls short of the meaning usually attached to the word. Some word like purpose is necessary, implying that the payment of devotion is regarded as an end in itself, although it may not be the only or chief end in view. A politician visiting the King on business of state may pay him some outward mark of homage incidentally, and he may do this quite systematically whenever he has occasion to pay such visits. But if his visits are not paid in some part at least for the *purpose* of paying homage—if, for instance, he would not visit him at all unless business of state made it necessary—then his actions do not satisfy the full sense of the word cult. If, on the contrary, I habitually go out of my way to watch the King when there is a royal procession, then the payment of homage is presumably the purpose of my action. In the former case there was no cult of the King's

person; in the latter case there is. In some cases, of course, the two purposes, the payment of homage and the transaction of business, may be combined. The application of the illustration is obvious. It may be used for the purpose of communion and sacrifice, and subordinately for the purpose of adoration. In this case we have a true cultus of the sacramental presence.

Many of those who believe in the sacramental presence attend the eucharist for the purpose solely and only of making their communion and of joining in the sacrifice; their adoration, although it is paid systematically, is, as they make a point of saying, incidental. An attitude of this kind falls short of being a cult of the sacramental presence.

There are, we must notice, some strenuous defenders of the cultus who may demur to the assertion, however carefully we guard it, that the purpose of devotion is one of the purposes for which the sacramental presence should be used.

Mr. Baverstock, for instance, makes, if we interpret his words rightly, two points: He seems at first sight to hold that devotion is not even a subordinate purpose for which the sacramental presence is given us; yet he maintains at the same time that if it is not God's purpose, it is at least God's will and intention that such adoration should be paid. His words are:

"In speaking of the purpose of the presence, it is vital to emphasize the nature of the Incarnation-principle. The root fact about the Blessed Sacrament is that it *is* the Sacred Humanity. The Sacred Humanity is with us for the same purposes as always:

"First, to glorify God—*i.e.*, as the Saving Victim, the Supreme Propitiation, the Sacrifice.

"Secondly, to save men . . . as the food of our souls.

"Neither of these two main purposes in itself includes adoration. We may say quite truly that Christ did not come to earth or go to heaven to be worshipped, and that He did not give Himself in the Blessed Sacrament to be worshipped. But the worship of our Lord, whether then or now, is an inevitable consequence of the fact that He is God manifested in the flesh. If, in a sense, it was not His purpose in either case that we should worship Him, it was undoubtedly His intention, His will, that we should do so. The cases of the blind man, of St. Thomas, etc., are relevant here. We are doing as they did, with His approval, when we worship Him in the Blessed Sacrament."

But against this position there are several things to be said:

(*a*) It cannot be denied that defenders of the cultus do in many cases habitually think and speak in a way which implies quite definitely that the sacramental presence is given us, and is used for, the purpose of devotion. Dr. Gore draws attention to this point in criticizing what he thinks is a prevalent and an unsatisfactory mode of regarding the eucharist:

"A prominent feature (of books of popular devotion) is the stress they lay on the worship of Christ, as, in virtue of consecration, made present upon the altar. Thus, going to the eucharist (apart from the question of communion) is spoken of as 'going to meet Jesus.'"

The case is still more clear with regard to the reserved sacrament. Thus the Bishop of Newport writes:

"Naturally, it is impossible that we should have in our Churches perpetually present . . . the Body and Blood, the Soul and Divinity of Christ —the very Christ under sacramental veils—without making them a prominent object—perhaps, I might say, the chief object—of our religious occupation, whether exterior or interior" (*The Holy Eucharist*, p. 253).

It certainly seems undeniable that visits to the reserved sacrament are paid with the express purpose of adoration. Communion and sacrifice are not at such times in question. As the Council of Trent bluntly says:

"Christ is set up before the people to be adored."

Those who hold it right to use the sacramental presence in this way for the purpose of adoration must hold also that it was in part given for this purpose; otherwise there would be a disharmony between God's purpose and our own.

(*b*) It is extremely doubtful whether we can ever make a sharp distinction between God's purpose and God's intention. Certainly, in the present connection, the distinction seems unreal or oversubtle. We can hardly hold that what is "an inevitable consequence of God's manifestation in the flesh" is not at least a part of the *purpose* of that manifestation. . . . God's purposes, though not man's, include their ultimate consequences.

The real distinction to be stressed is that between

a main purpose and a subordinate one. This fits the facts; but when we use it we must remember that a subordinate purpose, after all, remains a purpose still.

5. Lastly, in our definition, we coupled together the words devotion and adoration as expressing our attitude to the sacramental presence. The point is this: The word "adoration" by itself does not express the attitude of those by whom the cultus is used. They come into the sacramental presence, not only to adore Christ, but to think of Him, to pray to Him, to stimulate their faith in Him, to have intercourse with Him, or, simply, to be with Him. The word "devotion" may be used to summarize all the various aspects of this many-sided attitude.

Adoration is, no doubt, the word most commonly used in connection with the sacramental presence and it is better to retain it for this reason; strictly speaking, it is included in the word "devotion."

NOTE.—Dr. Weston has objected to the employment of the word "use" in the expression, "the use of the sacramental presence for the purpose of devotion." He asks:

"Do I *use* a friend if I raise my hat to him? . . . No one who talks simple English will admit that he *uses* the Sacrament when he genuflects at the tabernacle. . . . The Blessed Sacrament is not *used* when I worship it" (*God with us*, pp. 131-2).

This objection can perhaps be met by pointing out other cases in which the word "use" is employed quite naturally. If the King comes to open an exhibition, the children from the schools may be taken to see him. We should not speak of "using the King" to arouse their patriotism, but we might very well speak of "using the King's *presence*" for that purpose. Similarly we do not "use Christ" to

arouse our devotion, but we may "use Christ's *presence*" in the eucharist or in the tabernacle to arouse our devotion, as a means to the further end of paying honour to Christ Himself. We have employed the term to distinguish the cultus from worship which is merely incidental, and Dr. Weston will probably agree that the distinction exists. Employed in this way the expression seems harmless. If his criticisms had been read before the bulk of this book had been written, we might perhaps have inserted the term "coming to the sacramental presence," instead of "using the sacramental presence," for the purpose of devotion.

PART II

THE MAIN ARGUMENTS FOR THE CULTUS IN EACH OF ITS TWO FORMS.

CHAPTER V.

THE MAIN ARGUMENTS FOR THE CULTUS OF THE SACRAMENTAL PRESENCE IN THE EUCHARIST.

I.—Preliminary Points.

The sacramental presence is an adorable presence and a presence that demands adoration. These assertions rest on the identification of the outward signs with the body and blood of Christ; they do not involve, as is sometimes alleged, the theory of a local presence.

II.—Summary of Arguments.

1. *The evidence of experience and conviction is in favour of the cultus—the use of the sacramental presence for the purpose, though not mainly for the purpose, of devotion and adoration. This evidence is not conclusive, but it has considerable weight.*

2. *It is as much a privilege and a duty to be in the sacramental presence and to pay it our devotion as it was a privilege and a duty for the disciples to be in Christ's visible presence and to adore Him (as St. Thomas did in the upper room).*

3. *The value of the presence and of the cultus rests on the principle that God brings His personal reality home to us by outward acts of which the Incarnation is the chief, while the eucharist is an extension of the Incar-*

nation. A vital point in this argument is that in the sacramental presence Christ is present in action. It is not a Christ Who is simply "there" waiting passively for our adoration, Who is the object of the cultus, but a Christ at work, offering Himself in sacrifice to the Father, and offering Himself to us as the Food of our souls.

A presence of this kind, finally, is one which helps us to concentrate our thoughts on Christ, which helps us, as defenders of the cultus so often urge, "to say our prayers."

In this chapter we summarize as shortly as possible some of the main arguments for the cultus. In succeeding chapters we discuss at greater length the objections to which they are liable; in the course of the discussion further light is thrown on the arguments themselves.

A summary of this kind is needed in order that the essential simplicity of the main arguments may not be concealed by the mass of objections, rejoinders, and explanations to which they give rise.

We must notice that most of the objections dealt with in this part of the book apply to the cultus of the sacramental presence in both its forms, to the cultus, that is, of the sacramental presence in the eucharist and to the cultus of the reserved sacrament. Objections dealing specially with the reserved sacrament will be found later.

I.—Preliminary Points.

In the sacramental presence the outward signs are in some way identified with the body and blood of

Christ, and so with Christ Himself. We can truly say that the bread is Christ's body; that the sacramental presence is a real objective presence of Christ. There is no need to dwell on this point, as it has already been considered at length in the first chapter. It seems to follow from this identity that the sacramental presence is an adorable presence, and a presence that demands adoration. This view, as we have also observed, is taken by the majority of those who believe in the real presence at all. When we come into the sacramental presence it is as fitting and necessary to adore Christ as it would be if He appeared before us in visible form.

The objection has been made (*e.g.*, by Dr. Strong quoted above) that the adoration of Christ in the sacred elements depends on the theory that the presence is a local presence. This does not seem to be the case. It is sufficient for the purpose of such adoration to believe that in coming spatially nearer to the *host* we come in a real sense, if not in a spatial sense, nearer to Christ; and this belief follows from the fact that the host is identified with Christ's body and so with Christ Himself. Dr. Strong seems to accept this identification. He says, indeed, that we have no right " to define the relation which exists between the sacramental elements and that which they convey "; but he says also that " the bread and wine *are* by Christ's command truly His body and blood " (*The Real Presence*, pp. 47, 60).

It is true also that some writers speak as though adoration were not due to the sacramental presence, even though, as they explicitly allow, that presence is a real presence of Christ. They say correctly that

Eastern practice pays no outward homage to the reserved sacrament. They say also that in the early centuries, though the outward signs were treated with great reverence, and though homage was paid in the eucharist to Christ, it was not paid to Him as specifically related to the host. As Dr. Gore tells us, eucharistic worship, in the modern meaning of the phrase, paid to Christ "under the forms of bread and wine" was not prevalent.

It is difficult, and perhaps impossible to prove the necessity of eucharistic adoration in the ordinary sense of the phrase. But we can urge that its reasonableness seems to follow from the identification of the outward signs with Christ Himself. If Christ is there, He must be adored. We can urge the prevalence of such adoration from an early, if not the earliest, period to the present day. We may also urge that those who believe in the presence, and at the same time withhold adoration, have not apparently worked out their case in any considerable way, while it is on them that the burden of disproof must rest.

II.—Summary of Arguments.

The arguments for the cultus (*i.e.*, the use of this presence for the purpose of devotion and adoration) may be stated as follows:

1. The evidence of conviction and of experience (or of what is thought to be experience) is often brought forward as one of the main arguments for the legitimacy and value of the cultus. It must be allowed that unanalyzed convictions and experiences taken by themselves, apart from the grounds on which they rest, are inconclusive. The evidence,

nevertheless, has considerable weight in regard to the eucharist especially, and also in some degree to the reserved sacrament.

2. The fact that the sacramental presence is an adorable presence, and a presence that demands adoration, involves more than merely incidental adoration; it involves the use of the sacramental presence for the purpose of adoration. We are all agreed that devotion and adoration are essentials of the Christian life. Now, a presence that demands devotion is fitted also to kindle and to intensify devotion, and should be used for that purpose, not because the kindling of our devotion is our ultimate aim, but because by our devotion the honour of God is advanced. Further, the mere fact of being in such a presence is of itself a privilege, and if such privileges are granted, they are to be used deliberately and habitually. To neglect them or to use them casually or incidentally is to waste them.

Our relation to the sacramental presence is, to some extent, like the relation in which the disciples stood to the visible presence of Christ on earth. It was a privilege for St. Peter, at a critical moment of the earthly ministry, to recognize who and what his Master really was, and to utter his great profession of faith, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God." It was a privilege for the wise men to worship before the manger. It was a privilege for the three chosen disciples to witness the Transfiguration—St. Peter was not altogether wrong when he said it was good for them to be there. It was a privilege for St. Thomas to see the glorified Christ, and to feel himself impelled to say adoringly, "My Lord, and my God."

It is a privilege for the saints in heaven to worship God and the Lamb. Such privileges are to be used and not wasted.

Now Christ is with us still in the sacramental presence. The cultus—the use of the sacramental presence for the purpose of adoring Christ, for the purpose just of being with Christ—is not only a privilege but a duty. To deny this is a paradox. The burden of disproof lies with the objector.

3. The eucharist of which the sacramental presence is a part is an extension of the Incarnation; its necessity and value rest on similar grounds.

In various ways, through nature, through conscience, through the bible, men may come to know something of the existence and nature of God; but all such methods of gaining knowledge are insufficient. God brings home to us the knowledge of Himself as a personal reality and comes into close personal relation with us, by outward definite events, acts, and deeds, of which the Incarnation is the supreme centre and example. By such acts God breaks, as it were, through His official routine, through His normal working in nature and history. By their means He gives us knowledge of Himself as contrasted with knowledge of truths about Himself. We cannot say of nature or of the bible or of conscience, "These are God;" they are not themselves objects that we can worship. But in the acts to which we have referred we can say, "God is here; this is the finger of God; lo, this hath God done; behold, it is His work." In such acts God Himself is present, and we are constrained to fall down and worship Him. The eucharist is an extension of the great act of the Incarnation. In the sacramental

presence we come to know Christ with a personal knowledge, and in Christ we know God. Apart from the sacramental presence we should be forced to realize the eternal fact of the Incarnation by efforts of the imagination, by the memory of past history, and our imagination and our memory would be inadequate to the task. Divinely appointed symbols might help us, but they would not have the efficacy of divine acts by which eternal facts are brought home to the mind and the heart. Among such acts the sacramental presence is pre-eminent, and it must be used for the purpose for which it was given, for communion, for sacrifice, and for devotion. It helps us to concentrate our thoughts on Christ, by giving us not merely a symbol of His presence, but that very presence itself.

A vital point in this argument is that in the sacramental presence Christ is present in action. It is not a Christ Who is simply "there" waiting passively for our adoration, Who is the object of the cultus, but a Christ at work, offering Himself in sacrifice to the Father, and offering Himself to us as the Food of our souls.

A presence of this kind, finally, is one which helps us to concentrate our thoughts on Christ, which helps us, as defenders of the cultus so often urge, "to say our prayers."

We may say in conclusion that while the reasonableness of the cultus appeals to the mind as well as to the feelings, strict proof, of the sort that will enforce assent, is unattainable. The cultus is in harmony with our faith as a whole, and we must be content to draw out that harmony. In the result, if we see it, we see it; and if we don't, we don't.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MAIN ARGUMENTS FOR THE CULTUS OF THE RESERVED SACRAMENT.

The arguments for the cultus in the reserved sacrament are for the most part the same as those for the cultus in the eucharist, but there is one significant omission—they contain no reference to a presence of Christ "in action." The question as to whether this omission invalidates the arguments will be considered in the last part of this book.

THE two forms of the cultus, so its defenders maintain, stand or fall together. If it is an advantage to have a temporary presence in the eucharist, it must obviously be an advantage to have a permanent presence in the tabernacle. In each case we have a presence that demands adoration, a presence that is a privilege as much as was the visible presence of Christ during His earthly ministry, a presence that brings home to us Christ as a personal reality, a presence that kindles devotion and helps us to concentrate our thoughts; and, finally, a presence the value of which is endorsed by the evidence of experience and conviction.

So far, it is true, the arguments are the same as those used in the last chapter, in speaking of the cultus in the eucharist.

But we must be careful to notice that the arguments do not make mention of the point that in the eucharist Christ's presence is "a presence in action." How far the arguments are affected by this omission will be considered later. But we must add this, that the omission in question does not seem to make much difference to the objections dealt with in the next part of the book. If they are, as we think, unsatisfactory, they are unsatisfactory as regards both forms of the cultus.

PART III

UNSATISFACTORY OBJECTIONS, MOST OF WHICH ARE DIRECTED AGAINST BOTH FORMS OF THE CULTUS ALIKE. (SPECIAL OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE CULTUS OF THE RESERVED SACRAMENT IN PARTICULAR ARE CONSIDERED IN THE LAST PART OF THE BOOK.)

CHAPTER VII.

INTRODUCTORY.

The objections dealt with in this part of the book are for the most part equally applicable to the cultus in both its forms. It is true that many of the quotations were written with special reference to the cultus of the reserved sacrament; but when they are examined they seem to bear on the cultus in the eucharist as well—on the use, that is, of the sacramental presence for the purpose, though not mainly for the purpose, of paying adoration to our Lord.

We work up to the conclusion that these objections are, on the whole, unsatisfactory.

Special objections, as we have said before, against the cultus of the reserved sacrament in particular will be considered later.

CHAPTER VIII.

EXPERIENCE AND CONVICTION.

It is objected that the evidence of experience and conviction is not sufficient to prove the value and legitimacy of the cultus:—Alleged experiences are not always real experiences; convictions are often mistaken and mutually inconsistent; the sense of gain felt by those who use the cultus is beyond dispute, but it does not follow that the gain is real gain.

Yet the evidence, even though by itself inclusive, has considerable weight.

I.—Points Generally Admitted.

The number of those who use the cultus, who visit the reserved sacrament for the purpose of adoration, and who use the sacramental presence in the eucharist for (in part) the same purpose, is very large. If we accept their own estimate, they derive from it great help and comfort; they have a positive conviction, an "experience," to use their own word, of its value. This admission is made freely, and there is no need to dwell at length on the depth and extent of the conviction; on the evidence of countless churches frequented by devout worshippers, men and women, old and young, rich and poor, learned and ignorant alike, drawn there by the sacramental

presence whether in the eucharist or in the reserved sacrament.

It must also be admitted that the bare absence of such conviction among large numbers of good Christians is of itself no evidence against the value of the cultus, in the face of positive evidence in its favour. An illustration brings out the point. If I think I see a horse in a field, I have probably at least seen something. The fact that my friend sees nothing is not impressive; his failure to see what I see may be due to his short sight. Similarly, absence of conviction as to the value of the cultus may be the result of absence of insight; it has no weight regarded as a disproof of that value.

II.—The Evidence of Experience and Conviction is Inconclusive.

These admissions do not prove the defender's case.

1. In the first place, as to *experience*. Experience is a word which, from an argumentative point of view, begs the question. Strictly speaking, it implies insight, intuition, and real knowledge; you cannot have an "experience" of what is non-existent any more than your "knowledge" can be mistaken. Certainly, if experience of a fact exists, for those who have it, the question may be closed; but it is not evidence to those who do not have it. Further, the objector has the right to doubt whether the alleged experience is a real experience. I may think I see things I don't see. My horse may turn out to be a cow; I really did see something, but I have interpreted what I have seen wrongly. I may think I have experience of my friend's honesty,

and he may turn out dishonest. My "experience" of his honesty was not a real experience; it was only a conviction. Similarly, in the present case. Because many people claim a direct experience of the value of the cultus, that is no sure proof that their claim is right.

2. The fallibility, in the next place, of *convictions* is notorious. Men have been strongly convinced that idols and "high-places" are legitimate and valuable helps to worship. Antinomians have been assured that they are in favour with God through "faith only," though their conduct has been un-Christian enough and even scandalous. Many Churchmen are convinced of the value of excessively sentimental mission hymns. Romanists are convinced of the value and truth of the doctrines of the papal infallibility (as a Pope said, "before I was enthroned I believed it; now I know it"); and of the doctrine of the immaculate conception ("it was a dogma of the heart before it was a dogma of authority").

Yet we are not precluded from thinking that some or all of these convictions may be mistaken. Aids to devotion, and the cultus among them, are not necessarily aids to the right kind of devotion.

It is then an error to suggest, as Mr. Underhill seems to do, that the case for the cultus transcends the need of argument.

"Facts," he says, "remain. Let people talk as they will about the danger of localizing the presence, and about tendencies to materialize the sacrament, and all the rest. . . . Churches where the Blessed Sacrament is reserved are the churches which really are the homes of the people, where you

find an irresistible appeal, and a warmth and gladness which, whatever may be the arguments brought against them, are unique in their power" (*Catholicism in Practice*, p. 197).

Mr. Underhill, it is fair to say, is not writing a controversial or theological treatise, and is only referring to the matter incidentally; but many defenders of the practice press the point as though it were conclusive. Their attitude is provocative; it brings their case into suspicion with men who want to have a reason for their faith, and it is also inconsistent with the line they take up on other occasions. For these same people who exalt the claims of direct experience, intuition, immediate knowledge, and the like, at the expense of reasoning, are ready enough to pay no attention to such claims when put forward against positions they maintain themselves. We see this in the case of art. The upholders of ancient modes of music, of romanesque architecture, of liturgical forms of worship, or of an elaborate ceremonial, set aside with very little consideration the pleas of opponents who plead that their own warmest and deepest feelings are stirred by Dykes and Stainer, by Gothic architecture, by extempore prayers, and by a simple form of worship. To some extent we are quite right in disparaging the evidence of unanalyzed feeling and conviction. Right judgment in art is not a mere matter of taste, but of good taste resting on rational principles; the question is not what we feel, but what we ought to feel. Browning makes Abt Vogler say, "Others may reason, and welcome; but we musicians know." Unfortunately, the musicians, and all the artistic

experts, habitually contradict each other; their dogmatism is no sure guide to the layman. The evidence of conviction is ambiguous in the case of art, and it is irrational to treat it as though it were infallible in the sphere of morals and religion.

3. The evidence of conviction is inconclusive for another reason. Convictions in favour of the cultus are met, not merely by absence of conviction, but by positive convictions pointing in another direction; by positive convictions about true principles of worship with which the cultus seems inconsistent. These convictions, since they are positive convictions, have in themselves just as much right to respect as the convictions of those by whom the cultus is defended. Many examples of such convictions will be found among the various objections that we have to consider, and we need not anticipate them.

III.—Yet the Evidence is not without Weight.

It is quite true that the evidence of conviction and experience is inconclusive, but it is not true that it has no weight; on the contrary, it may be, and in the case of the cultus it is, extremely impressive. If it does not establish the certainty of its value, it does at least give that value some probability, and it does make a claim on sympathetic and intelligent investigation. We cannot lightly set aside what men have felt so deeply, so widely, and for so long a period—for several centuries in the case of the reserved sacrament, and for a much longer time in the case of the eucharist.

So far as the evidence deals with the feelings it

can be safely accepted. When thousands of people tell us that they experience a sense of gain in the sacramental presence it would be absurd to try to persuade them, or to persuade ourselves, that they feel nothing of the kind. In the strict sense they do *experience* that sense of gain. It is, of course, quite another thing to infer that the gain is a real gain, that it does not involve corresponding disadvantages, or that it rests on good grounds. Such questions are open to discussion.

CHAPTER IX.

EXPERIENCE AND CONVICTION (*Continued*): THE BALANCE OF LOSS AND GAIN.

It is objected that the sense of gain felt in the sacramental presence involves a sense of loss when we are away from it, and that the sense of gain is necessarily outweighed by the sense of loss.

This objection is unsound.

I.

Even if we admit (so it is said) what those who use the cultus tell us as to the sense of gain they feel when in the sacramental presence, this by no means proves that they are gainers on the whole, even from the point of view of their own feelings, and assuming that such sense of gain is real gain. On the contrary, their sense of gain when in that presence involves a sense of loss when they are away from it. Obviously, if it is to my advantage to be in some particular place, it is a disadvantage for me to be in another. Now, most of our life has to be spent away from the sacramental presence. Consequently, the feeling of loss, not merely balances, but outweighs the feeling of gain. Those who use the cultus are worse off than their critics.

This contention holds good quite apart from theo-

logical questions as to the nature of the presence; and it holds good even if it is admitted that the sense of gain, while it lasts, is real and well-grounded.

II.

In reality, the contention does not hold good at all. Still keeping strictly to the question of the feelings, with which alone the argument is concerned, we point out:

(*a*) Those who use the cultus, even if they suffer a sense of loss when away from the presence, do not lose on the whole as compared with their critics who never use it. If I have good friends whom I often visit, I may be sorry to leave them, but, other things being the same, I am in better case than the man who has no friends. So of visits to the sacramental presence. When absent from it I am as well off, apart from occasional regrets, as those who never think of it. I enjoy all their advantages in the way of prayer and meditation, and church services, while in the sacramental presence I enjoy additional advantages. The sense of loss is negligible as contrasted with the sense of solid gain.

(*b*) Further, temporary absence from the sacramental presence does not involve necessarily any sense of loss at all; at the worst I need feel nothing more than a temporary pang at parting. Privileges enjoyed continuously cease to be privileges. My pleasure in a friend's company does not mean that I am craving for it all day and every day. I may enjoy my holidays without being sorry they come to an end, at any rate without wishing that life were all one long holiday. The enrichment of one department of life

does not impoverish the rest. The same principles hold good of the cultus. The sense of gain is all to the good. There is no sense of loss that can be weighed against it.

(*c*) Thirdly, the sense of gain in the presence is carried over into the periods of absence. During those periods I am not merely on a level with the critic; the memory of the past and the anticipation of the future add to the pleasure of the present.

(*d*) The objector's argument proves too much. If it held good, we should have to forbid the use of churches for prayer on the ground that, while they are aids to worship when we are in them, we lose during the longer periods when we are going about our ordinary business.

We note in conclusion that this whole chapter is concerned entirely with a matter of the feelings. It does not in the least settle the question whether a feeling of gain is a real gain. It does, however, provide a satisfactory reply to the objection, in which this question is not brought up.

CHAPTER X.

EXPERIENCE AND CONVICTION (*Continued*): MORAL TENDENCIES.

The objection is made that the cultus tends to produce a self-centred, non-social, and emotional type of religion. (The case of "Jesus-worship" considered.)

The reply is that these tendencies are not necessarily involved in the cultus.

NOTE.—*The honour of God, not the deepening of our own devotion for our own sake, is the ultimate end of the cultus.*

I.

THE cultus, so say its opponents, does not exercise a high ethical influence. It tends to favour an easy and self-centred devotion. It tends (so Dr. Scott Holland suggested) to become a "religion of the sacristy," a religion that withdraws men from an interest in social welfare and that provides no recruits for personal service in the world's work. It belongs, according to Dr. Gore, to a mode of devotion which has received the name of "Jesus-worship," and which is marked not simply by the worship of Jesus, but by worship of an emotional kind directed especially to His human nature. . . . "Jesus-worship" of this kind is, he says,

"the distinctive feature alike of Protestant evangelicism and Catholic sacramentalism." [He describes it as] "the separate and distinctive worship of Jesus in His manhood, with all the specially tender associations of His human name; he maintains that it was not prominent in the first five or six centuries, and "that this type of devotion, whether in mission hymn-singing or in sacramental worship, has belonged to the emotional and devotional part of our manhood, rather than to the moral and rational" (*Body of Christ*, pp. 106-7).

At the same time, as Dr. Gore warns us, "Jesus-worship" is not to be confused with the worship of Jesus. The worship of Jesus as God is a Catholic practice in the strict sense of the word, a practice which goes back to the earliest ages of the Church.

II.

In reply to such objections, we urge that these undesirable tendencies are not peculiar to users of the cultus, and that the cultus is not necessarily the cause of, or to blame for, the tendencies by which it is accompanied.

1. We take first the accusation that the cultus tends to become an emotional form of religion of the sort described above as "Jesus-worship."

The cultus, we point out in reply, is essentially the worship of Jesus. There are, of course, plenty of emotional people in the world to whom "the manhood of Jesus with all the specially tender associations of His human name" makes a disproportionate appeal. Such persons will naturally tend to transform or deform the cultus, the worship of Jesus, into "Jesus-worship." Thus "Jesus-worship" is

frequently an accompaniment of the cultus, but to blame the cultus on this account is irrational. We might as well blame the Christian religion because it is accompanied by various forms of superstition, by an extreme form, for instance, of Mariolatry. Certainly, if there had been no Christianity, Mariolatry would not have existed either. But that is not to admit that the former is the cause of the latter. The true remedy is, not to discard the cultus, but to take care that when we worship Jesus we worship Him as He is; that we pay due attention to the claims He makes on our will and our intellect as well as on our emotions.

Then once more. The popular attitude to our Lord is often emotional, but the prevalence of this tendency has been exaggerated. "Gentle Jesus, meek and mild," and other hymns of this sort are not, after all, the only hymns we sing about our Lord. There is nothing specially emotional about "O Jesus, I have promised"; and the "Dies Iræ" is of an extreme austerity. It is, indeed, quite possible for popular thought to run in the contrary direction to this tendency. There have been times, for instance, when excessive emphasis was laid, not on Christ's tenderness, but on His severity—when the thought of Him as the Judge of the world overshadowed the thought of Him as the Saviour. There is no apparent reason in the nature of the case why the cultus should be connected with the one tendency rather than with the other, or why it should not steer a middle course between the two extremes.

2. In the second place, we take the charge that the

cultus tends to produce a selfish non-social form of religion. This objection also is unsatisfactory.

To begin with, there is no good evidence that this undesirable tendency is more common among users of the cultus than elsewhere. It was stated very positively in the National Mission literature that the aim of the ordinary parochial mission was the saving of individual souls. Many experienced missioners may regard this statement as unwarrantable. A great point, they will say, is usually made of personal service; the tag, or its equivalents, is always brought home to the hearers that "no Christian can be a good Christian unless he is trying to help others to be good Christians." However this may be, most of us would agree that it is usual enough for people to come to missions, however well conducted, and to be quite untouched by any desire except that of looking after their own spiritual interests. The official reports of the Archbishop's committees express very strongly their conviction of the individualism, the parochialism, the congregationalism which marks the life of the Church of England, and the absence from it of a real desire to exercise an influence on the nation outside. This prevalent selfish and non-social tendency can hardly be laid to the charge of the sacramentalism of the Church of England, and still less to its adoption of the cultus.

Then again, there is no particular reason given why the cultus should exercise this undesirable tendency. It is, of course, true that if people are inclined to be selfish and anti-social, and if at the same time they have a religious temperament, they will

make their religion a substitute for their social duties; and the more attractive, intense, and fascinating their religion, the easier it is to use it as such a substitute. But it would be bad logic to set aside everything that is attractive, because attractive things can be made ends in themselves and used to further our own interests, instead of as a stimulus to the pursuit of our duty. If we took that line, we should find ourselves abolishing, not only the cultus, but music, art, and literature. All these things can be, and often are abused.

Our complaint against the objector is that he almost forces us to repeat the old maxims about the abuse of a thing not taking away the use, and *post hoc* not being *propter hoc*—maxims of which he is as tired as we are ourselves. But the blame lies on his shoulders because so often he makes his objections without forestalling this very obvious reply, which, so one would think, he must know lies ready to the hand of those with whom he disagrees.

3. A third charge—namely, that the cultus of the reserved sacrament, in particular, tends to a solitary, non-congregational, and therefore a selfish worship—will be considered in the last part of this book.

Note.—When we speak of the cultus as an aid to devotion we must guard ourselves from thinking that the deepening of our devotion for our own sakes is our ultimate aim.

Devotion is paid to Christ for Christ's sake, not our own. We do not adore Him to cultivate our powers of adoration—for the sake of our religious self-development—any more than we do kind acts

to cultivate the virtue of kindness, or unselfish acts to cultivate the virtue of unselfishness. To do so would be to defeat our purpose. If we were thinking of our own interests, even of our own higher interests, our acts would be kind and unselfish no longer. It is the splendour of God and the good of others that we are to keep in view. Yet to value the cultus because (though not *only* because) it deepens our devotion is right, since the more intense such devotion becomes the more the divine honour is advanced.

CHAPTER XI.

THE VISIBLE PRESENCE.

It is objected that the adoration paid to Christ's visible presence on earth is not an argument for the cultus; for, as the visible presence was withdrawn, it is presumably not needed, and the kind of adoration that was paid to it is not needed either.

This objection is unsatisfactory, as the sacramental presence, unlike the visible presence, has not been withdrawn. The analogy, therefore, to some extent, holds good.

NOTE. 1.—*Critics have thrown doubt on the historicity of the incidents in which adoration was paid to the visible presence. But the non-historicity of the incidents does not necessarily affect the argument.*

NOTE 2.—*The objection considered that incidental adoration only is required by the sacramental presence.*

I.

WE may begin by summarizing one of those main arguments put forward by defenders of the cultus and explained at length in a previous chapter. They lay stress on the adoration paid to Christ's visible presence on earth, and argue that to be in that presence was, in itself, a privilege. They argue

further that the sacramental presence affords us a privilege of the same kind. If it was good for the disciples to adore the risen Christ, it is good for us to adore His presence in the sacrament.

II.

It is objected that the argument does not bear the weight put upon it. The visible presence was withdrawn. It was, indeed, good for St. Peter to be on the Mount of the Transfiguration, but our Lord did not accept his suggestion that he should remain there, and it is expressly stated that when he made the suggestion he did not realize what he was saying. On another occasion Christ told the disciples explicitly that it was good for them that He should go away. There is a sense, therefore, in which Christ is absent, and in which His absence is better for us than His presence. Men may naturally desire to hold such a presence as a perpetual possession, but it does not follow that it would have been good for the disciples, or that it would be good for us, to have such desires granted.

The case of miracles and visions affords an obvious analogy. They arouse reverence and prayerfulness. But God does not grant them habitually, because, presumably, they are not needed. Not all methods of stimulating desirable states of mind are necessarily desirable methods. As Father Waggett says:

"It is perhaps in order that the movement of our minds should be heavenward, that God . . . withdraws from us those tokens of his presence (that lie in) the sphere of our sense. If (they) . . . were long continued, the heart would not be led on to seek God

in His secret places, but would make even of His holy tokens the treasure and pride of a natural frame of experience, the ornament of a circle of earthly and unspiritual accomplishment" (*Holy Eucharist*, p. 301).

III.

The objection is not conclusive. Christ's words "It is good for you that I go away," may refer to the withdrawal of His *visible* presence only. A visible presence, like miracles and visions, has not been given us, and we may infer, therefore, that it is not needed; but the sacramental presence *has* been given us, and the fact that it has been given justifies its use for the purpose of devotion, or at any rate deprives of all weight the objection with which this chapter is concerned.

NOTE I.—Many students of the New Testament maintain that the historicity of some of these incidents, the adoration, for instance, paid by the Magi and by St. Thomas, is not beyond dispute, and that they cannot safely be used for the purpose of the argument. "It is not at all certain," so one of them has said, "that our Lord was ever adored as God during His life on earth."

The objection can be met without trenching on the grounds of historical criticism, for the argument does not altogether depend on the historicity of the narrative. The point is this: The evangelists, writing with the fuller knowledge of later times, felt that from their own standpoint such adoration was fitting under the circumstances described, whether it actually was given or not. If we attach any weight to their views on the matter as expressing the Christian consciousness of the early Church, then the illustrations in question will have weight, and will have great weight if we think that the writers' consciousness was an inspired consciousness—that they were guided

to give us an insight into religious principles, even though they are not to be taken literally in their account of historical facts.

NOTE 2.—It may be objected, as we have already hinted, that devotion should indeed be paid to the sacramental presence, but that such devotion should be incidental only.

It is right, as everyone will admit, that I should pay respect to some distinguished soldier or statesman by taking off my hat when I meet him in the street, but it does not follow that I should go out of my way to meet him in order to take off my hat, and so to cultivate my virtue of respect. It is right that I should handle a bible with reverence, but it does not follow that I should make a habit of handling bibles for the express purpose of showing them reverence. So, in general, the duty of incidental homage does not involve the duty of making a cult of the object to which homage is due.

We may reply that the illustration, if worked out, goes against the objector's case. A recognized part of the education that fits a man for society and citizenship is that he should be brought into contact with objects to which respect is due. That is why school children, to take an obvious instance, are made to take part every now and then in patriotic functions. We may not habitually go out of our way to meet distinguished people, but if we lived in some remote spot where there was nothing to remind us of the existence of those who in office or achievement are superior to ourselves, we should certainly be the losers. We must, of course, be on our guard against excess. Our fellow-men and material things are capable of being treated with an exaggerated and superstitious respect. But God cannot be treated with a reverence that is exaggerated or disproportionate. Devotion to God and Christ is an element in the Christian life, and must be cultivated. It is never more fitting than when we are in Christ's sacramental presence, and nothing is better able to kindle it and deepen it. To draw the line at incidental devotion is arbitrary. We have good grounds for insisting on the cultus.

CHAPTER XII.

SPIRITUAL ACCESS.

Spiritual means alone, it is objected, can bring us into closer relation with Christ.

The reply is that the sacramental presence gives us a presence that demands devotion, and by this means does bring us into closer relation with Christ.

I.

It has been said that the only bar to relation with Christ consists in our own faulty dispositions. It is by moral and spiritual improvement in our own character that relation with Christ can become closer, not by spatial closeness to objects which are identified with Christ, nor by spatial approach, if such is possible, to Christ Himself.

II.

But the objector's assertion is inconsistent with his own practice and feelings, assuming, that is, that he believes in the sacramental presence at all. For those who believe in it do for the most part feel bound to adore Christ present in the eucharist (even though they hold such adoration to be incidental only), and do not feel so bound in the street outside. The fact that they adore rests on a belief that in some

sense their approach to the sacramental presence has brought them into a fresh relation to Christ, a relation additional to that which they occupied before; and this double relation must, in its total effect, be a closer relation. They must admit, further, that it is a change in local position (not an increase in their spirituality) that has brought about this closer relation. It is the fact that they have passed from the street within the doors of the church in which the eucharist is being celebrated which makes the difference. No doubt their approach to the sacramental presence is accompanied by an increase of spiritual fervour, but this increase of fervour does not of itself create the impulse and obligation to pay the tribute of worship.

We may admit that if the man were carried into the church in his sleep, or that if he were there without knowing that the eucharist was being celebrated, he would not be brought into a closer relation with Christ. But this does not affect the point. We have not said that spatial nearness by itself constitutes nearness to Christ, but that it does so under normal conditions, *i.e.*, in the case of the faithful who know what the sacramental presence means, and who know that it is there. In such cases spatial nearness to Christ, or to objects with which Christ is identified, is not the result, but the cause, of any change that may take place in their spiritual attitude.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE UNIVERSAL AND THE HEAVENLY PRESENCE

There is admittedly a presence of Christ as God everywhere, and a presence of Christ as God and man in heaven. Christ is effectively present to us in both these modes of His existence in the sense of being always ready and able to hear and help.

Objectors maintain that this "effective presence" makes the sacramental presence needless for the purposes of the cultus; the sacramental presence cannot make the effective presence more effective than it is already.

The objection, however, does not meet the arguments already stated—i.e., that the sacramental presence gives us a presence which demands and kindles devotion and which brings home to us the personal reality of God. In these ways Christ's presence and His relation to us do become more effective, and the cultus is justified.

I.—Points Generally Admitted.

There are various modes of Christ's presence besides that of the sacramental presence. As God He is everywhere; this is His universal presence. Again, in His sacred Humanity, as perfect Man and perfect God, He is present to the saints in

heaven at the right hand of the Father; this is the heavenly presence. The presence of Christ in both these ways is thought of as an external transcendent presence in contrast with the mystical indwelling immanent presence which we have in mind when we say that Christ dwells in us and we in Him. All these different modes of the presence are real each in its own way, but it is not necessary here to go into the distinctions between them. The immediate points which will be generally admitted, and which we wish to emphasize, are these:

(*a*) Christ universally present as God is present to us effectively in the sense that He is always ready and able to hear and help, always able to see the secret thoughts of our hearts.

(*b*) We can say the same of Christ in His heavenly presence. It is true that as God and Man Christ is in heaven at the right hand of the Father. It may be true (as some defenders of the cultus urge) that it is absolutely heretical to speak of Christ's manhood as ubiquitous. It may be true, as some think, that Christ is in heaven as in a place, spatially distant from us, and so, in a sense, absent from us on earth. But the fact remains that, in a real sense, He is effectively present on earth, not only as God but as God and man, in the sense, as we have said, that He is always ready to hear and help. Spatial distance, if such distance exists, does not make it impossible or difficult for Him to know and to provide for our needs. The manhood and the Godhead are so united in the one Christ that what He knows as God He knows as man also. Neither does such

spatial distance make it any less fitting for us to worship Him, nor does it incapacitate Him from receiving our worship.

II.—The Objector's Point Stated.

So far we are agreed. We come next to the point where disagreement begins. There is no reason, it may be said, why in the nature of things mere spatial nearness to the Christ in His Sacred humanity (or to objects with which He is identified) should be regarded as a privilege or as having any practical or religious value for the purpose of devotion. The non-sacramental effective presence makes the cultus unnecessary (except, of course, for the purpose of communion).

An illustration helps to make the point clear both by its likeness and its unlikeness to the case we are considering. It is, of course, quite natural that I should wish to be spatially near my friend. Being near him makes me able to hear what he says, to see how he looks, and to share in his occupations. But if my friend is shut up in the next house or the next room, so that I cannot see or hear or communicate with him, his presence is not an effective presence; he might as well be a thousand miles away. Nearness is only an advantage so far as it improves means of intercourse. An invisible inaudible presence is in itself a presence without practical results.

In the same way, if the sacramental presence were a visible presence—if I could in it see Christ or hear Him—it would make a real difference, though, as we have seen, it might not be in any way beneficial. But, as things are, there is no question of

seeing Him. Again, wherever Christ is I have some sort of intercourse with Him; I am in relation with Him, and He is always ready to hear and help. His presence is an effective presence. No difference is made to this effective relation and to this effective presence by spatial closeness either to Him or to objects with which He is identified.

The cultus rests on the contrary conviction that such closeness does make Christ's presence and His relation with us more effective. This conviction has no sound basis; it is, in fact, a false conviction. The cultus is consequently an illegitimate cultus.

III.—Reply.

In reply, it is sufficient to point out shortly that the objection does not affect the arguments that have been already stated on behalf of the cultus.

To begin with, we may notice that the objector's illustration makes against his own conclusion.

If I have a passionate devotion to my friend, it is quite conceivable that I should find myself deeply affected by the fact that he is near me, even though I do not see him or hear him. The crowd is quite likely to display its patriotism outside the palace when the King is in residence, without troubling to ask whether he will come out to them, or even whether he knows what they are doing. His presence, although it is an unseen presence, serves as a centre of their loyalty, and is so far an effective presence.

The bearing of the illustration is obvious. It is true that Christ is always ready to hear and help, and that it is always fitting to lift up our hearts to

Him in praise or prayer. But the sacramental presence of Christ is a presence that not only admits of, but that demands, devotion; a presence that kindles devotion; a presence that brings home to us the personal reality of God and Christ; a presence that brings us nearer to Him in a real, if not in a spatial, sense by bringing us nearer to objects which are identified with Him. The cultus, and the sense of gain that accompanies it, rest on solid and rational grounds.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE UNIVERSAL AND THE HEAVENLY PRESENCE (*Continued*).

The cultus is said to militate against belief in the effectiveness of the non-sacramental external presence of Christ; to involve the notion that absence from the sacramental presence is absence from Christ Himself.

The reply is that, on the contrary, a special sacramental presence bears witness to a permanent presence of Christ.

NOTE.—*This objection against the cultus is said to be analogous with the hostility of the prophets to local foci of worship. The analogy, however, does not hold good.*

I.

IT must be admitted, so we are told, that some of those who use the cultus speak as though absence from the sacramental presence were absence from Christ. If the tabernacle is removed from a church, they complain that the Lord has been taken away from them. To go out from the sacramental presence is, in their eyes (so it would seem), to go out like Cain from the presence of God—to go out into exile. The expression of a French peasant waiting for a procession of the Blessed Sacrament—"Le bon Dieu n'est pas arrivé—indicates the same attitude.

The instructed Catholic does not use this language,

but the thought is there if it is not articulate. To make much of the sacramental presence does seem in all cases to involve the theory that, apart from it, Christ is less accessible—partially absent if not wholly absent—less ready to hear and help. The cultus, then, is really open to the objection urged in a previous chapter; the sense of gain which accompanies it is outweighed by a sense of loss—or, at any rate, this would be so if men worked out the implications of their beliefs.

Thus Mr. R. J. Parsons says, in a letter in the *Church Times*:

"It (the cultus) inevitably tends to weaken our sense of the perpetual presence of our Lord with and within us wherever we may be, for it suggests that nearness to Him varies according to the accessibility of the reserved elements, and that therefore He is further from us in our homes and our work than in our churches and our worship. The teaching about the "Real Presence," which underlies the cult, only too often implies a "real absence" of our Lord at the Eucharist before the actual moment of consecration. . . . Can we really believe that He is less truly present at a prayer meeting in a cottage than at a eucharist in church?"

Dr. Gore holds the doctrine of the real presence in a way which Mr. Parsons apparently rejects, yet he too arrives at the same conclusion when he speaks of the cultus of the presence, the use of it for the purpose of adoration as distinct from reception. He says:

"Its general tendency is hardly that of enabling us to realize the universal presence of God in the world" (*Body of Christ*, p. 140).

Thus, not only does this universal habitual effective presence make the cultus unnecessary [as the objector urged in the last chapter], but conversely the cultus tends to make us forget that this presence exists.

II.

The defender of the cultus has an obvious reply. Belief in a local presence, or in a presence related to a local object, does not at all militate against belief in the reality of a universal presence. On the contrary, it supports that belief. It is a commonplace in modern writers that the sanctity of sacred places and of sacred times—of churches and of Sundays—is not meant to, and does not secularize the city outside nor the work days of the week. On the contrary, it sanctifies them both; it emphasizes the fact that in all times and all places God is present. A presence, then, that demands adoration does not conflict with belief in an adorable presence everywhere.

Note.—The objector may support his case by a reference to Old Testament principles. Thus Canon Goudge says:

"It was one thing for the Hebrews to offer burnt offerings, . . . and another to worship before the 'pillars' of Bethel and Dan. The prophets and psalmists of the Old Testament are not all very favourable to the sacrificial system as they knew it, but they waged tireless war against the use of material foci of devotion. . . . As beings of flesh and blood, we must, if we are to worship at all, employ material means. (Even the Quakers, he points out, use their material brains when they say their prayers.) But . . . the association of God's presence with a pillar does degrade the conception of God, not only because God is represented unworthily, but also because it suggests that

where these material foci are not present, He is not present either. Indeed, all that localizes God tends in the same direction. The truth that God is spirit is really inconsistent with the belief that He is in Jerusalem as contrasted with Gerizim, or in Gerizim as contrasted with Jerusalem" (*Church Times*).

It may be said in reply that in the cultus we have the same paradox that was noted by the Old Testament writers when they said that God could not be contained in temples made with hands, while they insisted at the same time that the building of their own temple was in accordance with God's mind; that He desired a place where He might set His name and manifest His glory. The Shekinah may be a legend, but it does at least point to the way in which in these men's minds the two aspects of the case were noted and reconciled.

As to the attitude of the prophets it is not easy to be sure that their hostility was directed against foci of devotion as such, and not against the manifold abuses connected with them; against modes of worship that were of a purely formal and unspiritual character, taken over from heathen surroundings. The writers do not distinguish explicitly between these two grounds that may be thought to underlie their criticisms. We have the same difficulty with regard to their attitude towards other forms of religious observance. Isaiah's "bring no more vain oblations," and "your new moons and your sabbaths I cannot away with," seem at first sight an attack upon the sacrificial system as a whole and upon all regard to holy days and holy seasons; but we do not think it necessary to take his meaning in this literal sense.

We may notice, too, that if a multiplicity of foci are condemned, there is no general condemnation of the one focus of worship which the law allowed and commanded to be centred at Jerusalem. It is true that the altar was not, like the pillars, a localized object of worship. But the fact remains that the sacrifices were confined to one spot, and the principle involved is, to some extent, the same.

CHAPTER XV.

THE INDWELLING IMMANENT PRESENCE.

The objection is made that the indwelling immanent presence of Christ makes the cultus (the use of the external presence for the purpose of devotion) needless ; and conversely that the cultus militates necessarily against belief in the indwelling presence.

We reply :

(*a*) *That immanence and transcendence are complementary truths.* (*b*) *That the objection proves too much. If the immanent presence is all-sufficient it makes unnecessary, not only the sacramental presence, but the external transcendent presence in any form. But Christ as an object of worship must be regarded as external and transcendent, and the sacramental presence brings home to us this transcendence.* (*c*) *That the heavenly worship involves both forms of Christ's presence.*

Note *the heavenly worship and the symbolism of the Apocalypse.*

In this chapter it is not the external transcendent non-sacramental presence, but the indwelling, mystical, immanent presence, on which the objector to the cultus lays emphasis, and on which he rests his case.

We must notice first a matter of terminology,

The phrase "an indwelling presence" is metaphorical. "Presence," strictly speaking, implies some sort of spatial relation, while the presence of Christ within us has little or nothing to do with space. On this account it might be preferable to speak of "interior union." But the term in question is in such common use that it cannot well be discarded; and, after all, if we once began to discard metaphorical terms, the process would have no end.

I.

The objection that we are discussing is one on which great stress is laid by Dr. Gore. His arguments in the extracts given below have a special reference to the reserved sacrament, but they apply with equal force to the cultus of the sacramental presence in the eucharist. His first point is that the immanent presence makes an external presence needless. He says:

"If I believe that (Christ) in His manhood is within me, . . . and that I can within the tabernacle of my own heart hold closest intercourse with Him, I shall indeed entertain the deepest reverence for the Blessed Sacrament, . . . and adore Him Who is there present; but it seems to me almost impossible that, when I hold Him within me, and am permanently joined to Him in His manhood, I should passionately desire the opportunity of greeting Him in the tabernacle (or, we may add, on the altar—for the argument applies to this as well) under conditions in which He is obviously further from me and external to me, while at the same time I cannot see Him or hear Him, as the disciples did 'in the flesh'" (quoted in *English Church Review*, p. 168, March, 1918).

Dr. Gore's second point is the converse of the first. The cultus, he thinks, of an external presence tends to make us ignore the immanent presence.

"The devotion, as a whole, has a general tendency, and the general tendency is hardly that of enabling one to realize, . . . the constant presence of all Christians to the heavenly things, . . . or the indwelling presence of Christ in the soul of the individual and in the living church. The indisputable tendency of this devotion, and of the theology which reduces even the gift of communion to a temporary visit, is towards a conceiving of Christ's presence with the church as local and external" (*Body of Christ*, p. 140).

And again:

"It is a lowering of Christian devotion if a permanent external presence of Christ . . . comes to be the most usually entertained idea of the manner of His 'abiding with us,' instead of the indwelling of Christ *in* the members of His body (the only sort of abiding that the New Testament suggests" (*ibid.*, p. 138).

II.

It may, however, be replied that there is no such necessary antagonism between the cultus and this belief in an indwelling presence.

1. Transcendence and immanence are complementary truths. This, as we are well aware, is a commonplace of modern theology. It is a commonplace also that neither of these truths must be pressed to the exclusion of the other. Dr. Gore himself has brought this out effectively in his *New Theology and the Old Religion* in arguing against a

view in which the immanence of God is disproportionately emphasized at the expense of His transcendence. On the same principle we should expect that there is no antagonism between the immanent or indwelling presence of Christ within us and His external presence beyond us; we should expect, since Christ's presence exists in both ways, that we are related to Him in both ways; and lastly, we should expect that the desire for the indwelling presence does not exclude, and does need to be supplemented by, a desire for a relation with His external presence and with the sacramental presence in which that external presence is brought specially close to us, whether in a spatial sense or otherwise.

2. The objection proves too much. If the immanent presence is all-sufficient, it makes unnecessary, not only the sacramental presence, but any external presence whatever. Such a conclusion is inacceptable. Christ as an object of worship must be regarded as external and transcendent as well as immanent. It is difficult to see how we could worship Him if we left His transcendence out of account. The indwelling presence is a presence that seems to admit of degrees. Christ is more present in the saint than in the sinner. His work in us, even in the greatest of the saints, is thwarted by our sins and imperfections. As long as we think of Christ as He is in us, we are not thinking of Christ in His perfection. To forget this is to incur the danger, so prominent in the "New Theology," of minimizing the distinction between Christ and ourselves, of admitting that Christ is divine, but only "in the sense in which we are all of us divine."

Certainly, when we come to the question of worshipping Christ, He must be regarded as a Being who transcends us infinitely; within us, no doubt, but external to us, in the sense of independent of us, at the same time. The objector himself must allow this to be the case if he uses the ancient prayers of the Church. The *Te Deum* and the *Gloria* are cases in point. When we say, "Thou that sittest at the right hand of God in the glory of the Father," or "O Lamb of God, receive our prayer; . . . have mercy upon us," we are not thinking of the indwelling presence. But no one wishes that such prayers should be discarded. As the writer of *Ecce Homo* points out, it is the transcendence of Christ that brings home to us His infinite condescension in coming to dwell with us and within us.

What holds good of Christian worship in general holds good of the cultus. In the eucharist we expect to find all the elements of worship in their highest form. What we expect to find, we do find. The sacramental presence is given in part, though not chiefly, to bring home to us Christ's transcendence. It brings us into relation with a Christ Who is above us and in us at the same time.

3. *The heavenly worship described in the Apocalypse endorses this conclusion.* In heaven, as Mr. Baverstock argues, the interior union of the saints with Christ is more close than it can be on earth. He adds:

"Yet in heaven there is an external presence of Christ in His Sacred Humanity which is one of the crowning joys of blessedness. No one will suggest that the one militates against the other. Why

then should they do so on earth ?" (*English Church Review*, p. 171).

If " adoration of our Lord as externally present is (as someone suggests) a false harking back to the past," it is a fault of which the saints are guilty. Christ is in the fullest sense present in them, and yet they adore the Lamb on His throne. We may quote Mr. Baverstock again:

" We all think of our Lord as primarily the bread of the soul, feeding its life of union with Him. But that does not exclude, or even overshadow, the thought of Him as the desire of nations, and our desire too. No amount of the realization of one positive truth need or should exclude the truths which lead us to worship Him as God."

NOTE.—An Anglican writer, who opposes the cultus, says this reference to the Apocalypse brings us up against one of those ultimate problems which make discussion unprofitable, since the parties concerned are hopelessly disagreed—problems which cannot be settled without a full discussion of the extent and nature of biblical symbolism and inspiration, and the tangled problems of Church authority. He says:

" Those who use the imagery of St. John's vision as an argument for the cultus regard it as capable of a literal interpretation, and as implying that our Lord is in heaven and visibly present there as an external object. Such a use of the language of apocalyptic I cannot accept. Let us assume that St. John's vision was a real vision, different in character from the mass of current apocalyptic literature; and, indeed, its spiritual superiority is immeasur-

able. But even so I should contend that divine revelation makes use of the imagery familiar to the minds to which it is addressed without enabling us to know how far reality corresponds to it. Because St. Teresa saw our Lord as He is depicted in Spanish art it does not follow that the picture was objectively true. So with St. John. Divine symbolism sets forth truth as in our present state we are best able to realize it."

In reply to this criticism there are two things to be said:

First, whether the Apocalypse is symbolical or not, symbols are meant to represent facts and principles and to represent them truly; and one of these facts is the dominant place occupied by Christ as an object of worship over and above His indwelling presence in our hearts, His existence as an object independent of us, and not in any way limited by the poverty of the home our hearts can afford Him. The question as to whether this fact is a fact indeed is not materially affected by the conviction that the Apocalypse must be interpreted in a symbolical way.

Secondly, we may point out that, after all, the fact or principle to which we have referred is held independently of this particular passage in the Apocalypse. Defenders of the cultus use it to illustrate their views; they do not base on it alone their whole case.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE INDWELLING IMMANENT PRESENCE (*Continued*).

It is objected that defenders of the cultus do, as a matter of fact, disbelieve in or ignore the permanent indwelling presence. This is conspicuously the case with Roman writers, who hold that the presence given in communion is a temporary visit only.

The reply is:

1. *The objection goes too far. Many defenders of the cultus strenuously maintain this belief in the permanent indwelling presence, and impute this same belief to Roman writers also. The Roman view that the sacramental presence is temporary does not involve disbelief in a permanent non-sacramental presence.*

2. *The objection, however, does in some degree apply to some modern Roman writers, whose explanations of the permanent indwelling presence are ambiguous.*

3. *Conclusion: The objection is stated too unguardedly. In any case, as the last chapter showed, the cultus does not involve necessarily any disbelief in or ignoring of the permanent indwelling presence.*

I.—The Objection Stated.

We come to another objection, closely connected with the last, and for which Dr. Gore has made him-

self responsible. It is implied in the second extract given in the preceding chapter.

The point is this: Even if the cultus does not necessarily involve disbelief in, or neglect of, the immanent presence, yet such disbelief or neglect is commonly found among those by whom the cultus is defended, particularly among Roman writers. It was to them that Dr. Gore was referring when he spoke of "the theology which reduces even the gift of communion to a temporary visit." Certainly they seem to assert sometimes that Christ's presence within us ceases when the species are consumed. The well-known lines from Faber's hymn are frequently quoted as an expression of this view: "Jesu, gentlest Saviour, Thou art in us now," and "Oh, when wilt Thou always make our hearts Thy home?"

II.—Reply: The Objection goes too far.

Even if we admitted, which we do not, that the tendency to ignore the indwelling immanent presence may be widely spread among defenders of the cultus, it is certainly not a universal tendency. Many of them believe as strongly as anyone in that presence, in its reality and in its importance. Thus Mr. Baverstock, speaking for himself and for spiritual writers in general, says:

"Does the practice of making visits (to the Blessed Sacrament) tend to impair the sense of inward union with Christ? . . . (experience shows) that the direct opposite is the case. . . . We find an absolute consensus of spiritual writers that this cultus is a help to closer union with our Lord" (*English Church Review*, pp. 169, 170).

And again:

"Mystical writers from the first have insisted on this inward presence of Christ. . . . No true spirituality can afford to deny it. A false spirituality . . . will press it to the exclusion of sacramentalism. . . . But to lose sight of it is to forsake vital religion for a formal catholicism" (*ibid.*, p. 165).

Another passage may be quoted to the same effect. Mr. Baverstock is pointing out that it is a complete mistake to accuse him of disparaging the indwelling presence because he regards the phrase in this connection as "metaphorical." He says:

"I agree that the presence of Christ in us is every whit as real as the presence in the Blessed Sacrament. It is not precisely of the same character, because "presence" is properly a noun of position, and can only improperly or metaphorically be used of what does not predicate position, while the 'presence' of Christ *in* us utterly transcends position. Christ is in us and we are in Him. There is a union so close that all the metaphors taken from position fail to describe it. But this presence I claim to believe as strongly as anyone. I must not be held insensible to its blessed reality, its ineffable importance, because I point out that the word presence used of it is used metaphorically to describe what transcends all such terms."

III.—Yet the Objection is in Some Degree Applicable to Roman Writers.

The objection was made that Roman theology regards our Lord's presence in us after communion as a temporary visit only; and therefore that the presence ceases when the species are consumed.

It is replied that the language of Roman writers does not of itself necessarily justify the objection. When they speak of a temporary visit they may be referring to the *sacramental* presence. Now, on any view the sacramental presence does cease as soon as the outward part of the sacrament ceases, *i.e.*, when the species are consumed, when the bread ceases to be bread. This can hardly be denied: there are two parts in a sacrament, and a presence cannot be called a sacramental presence when the outward part is no longer there. But it does not follow that Roman writers who maintain this deny that a *non-sacramental* permanent indwelling presence may continue to exist in the soul. So far the reply is satisfactory. It is said also that in these same Roman writers the reality of the indwelling presence is explicitly asserted, and its importance is fully recognized. Thus the *Anima Christi* is one of the most popular of Roman Catholic prayers, it is habitually used after communion, and it is a prayer which is "instinct with the sense of nearness to Christ, of a positive incorporation of the Christian in the Sacred Humanity." This last quotation, and the gist of the whole paragraph, are taken from Mr. Baverstock's article in the *English Church Review* (1918, p. 170).

When we turn to Roman writers themselves we may see reason to think that their views are not quite so satisfactory as their apologists make out.

Full extracts must be given if we are to form an idea of what these views are. We summarize at the end the conclusions which may be based upon them.

Père Hugon, in his *La Sainte Eucharistie*, begins

by quoting St. Thomas to the effect that one of the principal ends of the eucharist is "to symbolize and realize the union of Christ with Christians and with the whole Church."

He goes on to say:

"The eucharist is *le signe et le facteur* of the union of the faithful with Christ." . . . The Fathers speak of it as "the extension of the Incarnation. . . . By the eucharist Christ unites Himself to each of us to be our life and the life of the Church."

He says that by communion Christ "*nous transforme en lui*" (pp. 20-22); and he speaks repeatedly of "*transformation en Jésus*" as a result of communion; of "our being able to say with St. Paul, 'I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me'" (p. 242).

Again, in speaking of frequent communion, he says that the preparation demanded by the presence within us of Christ in His sacramental state does not go beyond the disposition required by "*la présence substantielle de la divinité elle-même dans nos âmes*"; and he speaks in the next sentence of "*l'habitation permanente de la Trinité en nous*" (p. 275).

Father Dalgairns in *The Holy Communion*, a book first published in 1861, and re-edited by Allan Ross in 1911, goes into the matter at length. We give his explanations in a condensed form.

"It must have occurred to us to ask whether the Holy Communion produces any peculiar permanent union between Jesus and our souls. The moment of real union between the Body of our Lord and ourselves is, as we have seen, but short" (p. 186).

" Even that brief instant suffices to give us the right to actual graces. But these graces are not permanent, nor are they a real union with Jesus Himself. . . . (Yet Christ's words in St. John vi.) point to a continual special indwelling of our Lord in the soul . . . as the permanent result of Holy Communion. . . . Theologians have (therefore) looked for a real and peculiar presence of our Lord which would remain after His Body and Blood were gone " (pp. 186, 187).

What then, he asks, is the method of this union ? It is a question in regard to which the Church has left us free. There is no authoritative answer. Dismissing two theories as unsatisfactory, Father Dalgairns comes to a third.

(There is) " a special union between the *soul* of Jesus and ours." " When the species are consumed within us, the soul of Jesus remains behind, and continues the real union with us which it has contracted before (p. 192). (Thus) ' Jesus liveth in me ' is the constant motto of the saint " (p. 194).

He adds that this effect is explicitly ascribed to the Holy Eucharist in many writings of the saints, " particularly in St. Gertrude and St. Bonaventura " (see p. 195).

Mgr. de Gibergues commits himself to this same view quite uncompromisingly:

" Communion establishes a special and permanent union between the soul of Jesus and our own. After the Sacred Host is consumed the soul of Jesus remains within us, united to us, as at the moment of Communion, and continues to operate in us and by us. . . ." (*Holy Communion*, 2nd ed., Burns and Oates, p. 62).

At this point, however, we must call attention to a footnote added by Father Dalgairns' editor:

"The theory of the continual presence of our Lord's soul after the species are consumed, though finding support in Cienfugos, would seem to be without any solid foundation" (p. 192).

Father Dalgairns continues:

"In a matter which the Church has not decided, it is impossible for us to pronounce which of these theories is true. Enough, however, has been said to show that in some way or other the Holy Communion has a permanent effect upon our increase in sanctity, while the actual graces render it a marvellous instrument in the conversion of the worst of sinners. . . . In treating of the higher effects . . . we are obliged to use terms which resemble those of mystical theology" (p. 197).

We come now to the Bishop of Newport's book, *The Holy Eucharist*. He says:

"The actual graces given by the reception of the eucharist have been variously described by . . . theologians, but they all fasten upon that text of St. John, 'He that eateth my flesh . . . abideth in Me, and I in him.' These words are justly taken to mean transformation into Christ. . . .

"That Jesus should abide in man signifies that He becomes intimately present to man, not substantially, but touching by His efficacious contact man's powers and springs of activity. That man should abide in Jesus means that all his powers are subjected or held close to this Divine influence (p. 115).

"This union with Christ . . . brings about that other union, about which the Christian has always been so solicitous, the union of the members of Christ in one mystical body (p. 118).

"The effects of the Sacrament of the Eucharist may continue to accumulate as long as the sacred species are unconsumed. . . . If the communicant's good dispositions increase, the 'habitual' effect will increase as long as Christ is present."

On the whole the views expressed in these extracts are less clear than we could wish.

Père Hugon seems to maintain, in the most uncompromising way, the indwelling and permanent union. But when we investigate the point a doubt arises as to how far this union goes, and what precisely it means.

Father Delgairns says emphatically that there is such a union. He rules out two explanations, and the third, which he favours, is ruled out by the editor, who does not suggest another. He says that graces are given in communion, but expressly denies that these graces are the same as union with Christ. He ends tentatively by saying that in describing it we find ourselves "obliged to use terms which *resemble* those of mystical theology," yet it seems to be this mystical view which it is the interest of the Anglican writers to uphold. Then again, the Bishop of Newport also emphasizes the fact of union with Christ, but explains it as the subjection of man's powers to Christ's will. Christ does not become "substantially present" in us. It is apparently a moral union only that is implied. The Catholic Encyclopædia in the article on the Holy Eucharist apparently takes the same view.

Fr. Rickaby, in writing to Dr. Gore with explicit reference to this problem, says:

"Christ, as Man, thinks of, knows, and loves all His faithful, and in this sense is present with them.

Can we predicate a continued bodily presence of Christ's humanity in every man who is in a state of grace ? I do not know of any formal decision of the Church in the matter, but theologians, I believe, would be unanimous in answering in the negative" (*English Church Review*, February, 1917, p. 61).

(Dr. Stone's article in the same Review of March, 1917, should also be consulted.)

To sum the matter up: We seem, after all, to be left in some doubt as to whether Roman writers do support the theory of a permanent indwelling presence in the sense attached to that phrase by Dr. Gore and Mr. Baverstock.

IV.—Conclusion.

Even if Roman writers hold a minimizing theory of the permanent indwelling presence, it does not follow that this theory is in any way *involved* in the cultus, or even that the cultus tends in that direction. The tendency may very well accompany the cultus, without being its result. It is not observable in some of the Anglican writers by whom the cultus is defended.

There is no special pleading about this suggestion. In all departments of religion it is a common thing to find complementary beliefs which ought to be held together driving each other from the field. Thus a deep devotion to Christ as crucified for us may, and often does, accompany a practical disbelief in the work of the risen Christ in us. Yet we do not think that belief in the cross necessarily involves disbelief in the powers of the risen life, and we certainly do not ask people to give up one of these beliefs

in order to save the other. If, in the case of the cultus, or in any other case, we find this undesirable tendency to let slip one of two complementary beliefs, the moral is that we must resist that tendency and do our best to hold both beliefs in the unity and proportion of the faith.

CHAPTER XVII.

WORSHIP IN THE EUCHARIST.

It is urged that in the eucharist adoration is to be addressed only incidentally to the Christ and to His sacramental presence. The Father, or (rather) the Trinity, is the primary end of worship.

The reply is, that in the eucharist we worship the Father in, and not merely through, the Son. Primary aims do not exclude subordinate aims.

I.

Critics of the cultus insist on the principle that worship in the eucharist, and indeed at all times, should be addressed mainly to the Father. As the cultus errs against this principle, it must be regarded as illegitimate. Thus an Anglican writer says:

"The main purpose of the eucharist is not the worship of our Lord, but the worship of the Father through the Son. The heavenly presence of our Lord is not primarily given that we may adore and rest upon it, but that we may be caught up through our communions into the current of our Lord's self-oblation to the Father. . . .

"We cannot believe that this heavenly presence is granted us without worshipping Him Whose presence it is, our Lord Himself. But this is quite incidental, as the liturgies prove. The great prayers are addressed to the Father alone. The nearness

of our Lord is for communion, and for the power of worship which our communions bestow."

To put this point in another way: Our Lord in the eucharist is acting as our priest and sacrifice. He is offering Himself to the Father. In the eucharist we ought to be thinking of and harmonizing ourselves with His attitude. We ought to be engaged in offering Him to the Father and ourselves with Him. As the object of His action is the Father, that must be the object of our action also. So far as we make the Son the object of our devotion we are not thinking of what He is thinking; we are out of harmony with the principles of eucharistic worship. Men on a deputation to the King—a deputation of which the prince is the leader—do not interrupt the prince as he presents their petition in order to offer him their homage. Such homage would be irrelevant however well-intentioned. Similarly in the eucharist. There, as eternally, the Son's attitude is "towards" God, as St. John asserts; and our attitude must be the same.

II.

This objection will not bear the weight placed upon it.

(*a*) The illustration does not favour the objector's point. As a matter of fact, it would be quite fitting for members of the deputation, when their turn came to speak, to pay their homage to the prince as well as to the King. So in the eucharist it is certainly fitting that homage should be paid to the Son, for the Son is a representative not only of us men, but of the Father.

He and the Father are One. He is not only eternally "towards" the Father, but eternally *is* God. To ignore this identity in our worship is artificial and arbitrary. We do not only worship the Father with the Son at our side, or in us, helping us to worship rightly; we worship the Father *through* the Son, and the Father *in* the Son. Father, Son, and Spirit are together worshipped and glorified.

If this is true of worship in general, it is true also of worship in the eucharist, for the eucharist does more than embody or express one aspect of worship; it is the centre and sum of all worship.

(*b*) The payment of worship to the Son in His sacramental presence does not mean that we "rest on" that presence, as the critic alleges, in the sense of checking the progress of the action in which He and we are engaged. Christ remains our leader and High Priest in a great action—in the oblation of humanity to the Father. We are not arresting His motion towards the Father, as an instantaneous photograph arrests and misrepresents the movements of men in trying to represent them. We pay our worship to Christ as He energizes without checking or forgetting that unimpeded energy which is of the essence of the Godhead.

In the heavenly temple Christ is not merely the priest—for us and with us; He is Christ the Lord—Christ above us. The objector's attitude really amounts to a criticism on the heavenly worship, the principles of which, as we have seen, are represented in the Apocalypse. That worship is offered, as the first chapter reminds us, directly to the Son, and—according to the fifth chapter—"to God and the

Lamb." The most expert liturgiologist would scarcely venture to think himself authorized to modify this arrangement—to suggest that the Son should come down from His throne and share in the worship of the Father offered by the saints and angels, worshipping in them and with them, without being worshipped by them.

(*c*) The argument about "Jesus-worship" cuts both ways. It can be used, as the objector has used it, to disparage the cultus; but it can also be used to defend it. "Jesus-worship" may be a bold development, but it would be equally bold to delete all hymns of all denominations in which it is expressed. It contains a truth, and a truth that we cannot let go, the truth, namely, that *the worship of Jesus*, even if not right in the exaggerated or disproportionate form known as "Jesus-worship," is a necessary element in Christian devotion. If this is so, then the worship of Jesus should have its place in the eucharist just because the eucharist is, as we have said, the culmination and epitome of all valid worship.

If we allow that the worship of Jesus has become disproportionate, the moral is that the true proportion of things must be restored, not that such worship should be altogether discarded.

If it is retained, then, although it may have only a subsidiary place, yet it has a place, and in so far as it is addressed to the sacramental presence it is just what we mean by the cultus. The defence of the cultus does not pledge us to say that it has not been carried too far by many of those who use it. It does pledge us to the defence of the principles on which it rests.

CHAPTER XVIII.

LATE DEVELOPMENT.

The objection that the late development of the cultus makes against its legitimacy is inconclusive.

I.

In the first three or four centuries, so Dr. Gore points out, the evidence for what is now called eucharistic worship is ambiguous. In our own days some Catholics who believe in the sacramental presence do not believe in, or lay no stress on, the fact of its adorability, still less on the fact that it should be used for the purpose of adoration. To quote Dr. Gore:

"In the liturgies there is no separate worship of the incarnate Christ as specially made present on the altar in virtue of consecration. The idea of Jesus coming to be amongst us on His altar throne and of our coming to meet Him (otherwise than in receiving Him) is conspicuously absent. The mind of the ancient Church in general is represented in the canon of the African Council, 'When we stand at the altar, let the prayer always be directed to the Father (or, to be exact), to the Holy Trinity.'

"If we seek to supplement the liturgies from the writing of the great Fathers of the fourth and fifth

centuries, we find remarkably little to our purpose" (*Body of Christ*, pp. 102, 103).

He speaks of the reverence displayed in early times towards the consecrated elements as evidence for a belief in the sacramental presence, but he distinguishes this reverence from "what is now called eucharistic worship (the worship, that is) of the divine Christ present under the forms of bread and wine, of which the evidence is ambiguous" (*ibid.*, p. 75).

So some writers suggest that in the Eastern Church in our own times adoration is given, not so much to the sacramental presence in the species, but to a mystical presence diffused throughout the service; and they suggest further that it was the same sort of feeling which was present in the mind of the early Church at the period to which Dr. Gore refers.

II.

It is beyond the scope of this book to discuss the historical developments that we have mentioned. But there are reasons for thinking that without such inquiry the objections we have put forward can still be met. For, after all, a development is not always a wrong development. Dr. Gore does not apparently doubt or deny the legitimacy of eucharistic adoration, even though it may not have been practised in the early Church, and though he may think that such adoration should be incidental only. If this development is permissible, we cannot rule out additional developments just because they are developments; we cannot say offhand that it is wrong to take the

further step of using the sacramental presence for the purpose, though not *mainly* for the purpose, of adoration.

The question as to whether and how far the cultus resulted from and is dependent on the doctrine of transubstantiation is discussed in a later chapter.

CHAPTER XIX.

LOGIC AND MYSTERY.

It is objected that the mysterious nature of the sacramental presence and the fallibility of logic make inferences as to the use of the sacramental presence impossible.

The reply is, that the "absolute mystery" theory of the presence would remove it from the sphere even of faith; and that those who urge the fallibility of logic are inconsistent in the way they use it themselves. Each case in which logic is used must be considered on its merits.

I.

THE sacramental presence, it is said, is an absolute mystery. We cannot understand it, but it is revealed by God, and we must receive it by faith. As we cannot understand it, we cannot reason about it safely. Inferences based on a mystery of this incomprehensible character, inferences, for instance, as to the legitimacy of the cultus, are completely unreliable.

II.

But this objection is untenable. An absolute mystery which cannot be understood cannot be believed. Faith cannot receive it with the best will

in the world to do so, for there is literally nothing there to be received. We cannot have faith in an unknown *x;* in an assertion made in Chinese; or in any form of words which convey no meaning to the mind. A revelation that is not understood is not a revelation at all. It gives us, not only no grounds for basing inferences upon it that lead us to further truths, but no rational basis for practical action.

III.

A modified form of the objection is often put forward in harmony with the line taken by Mozley in his well-known sentence about logic. The sacramental presence is not an absolute mystery. The fact of the presence has been revealed. The fact, in a measure, we understand; we do not understand its mode. But, although we understand the fact in part, we cannot draw inferences from it, not because it is wholly incomprehensible, but because of the fallibility of human logic. It was the heretics, as Mozley says, who appealed to logic, and their reliance on logic was the cause of their heresies.

IV.

The contention seems unsatisfactory.

(*a*) In discussing the sacramental presence we must understand what the sacramental presence means, and it is impossible to make a sharp contrast between the meaning of the presence and its mode. In discussing, for instance, whether the presence is local or not, we are discussing at the same time both the meaning of a phrase and the mode of a fact.

(*b*) Further, those who disparage logic are inconsistent in the way they themselves make use of logic. Mozley's sentence is a case in point. "Be logical," he says, was the watchword of the heretics, and because they fell into heresy therefore (logically?) logic is unreliable. So in the case of the cultus. The majority of those who deal with it show not the slightest hesitation in trying to make distinctions between different modes of the presence, and in trying to prove by logic that these distinctions are sound—in spite of lip protests against such attempts. They argue freely, as we have seen, that the sacramental presence is "a real, supra-local, objective presence," that "it exists before reception," and that "the indwelling presence militates against the cultus of an exterior presence." They do not confine themselves, it must be noticed, to saying that the purpose of communion is the only purpose that has been revealed, and that therefore no other purpose can be safely inferred. They go further. They draw inferences to show that other purposes not only lack authority, but are definitely illegitimate.

Now, if it is right to bring forward logical arguments that make against the cultus, it is impossible to rule logic out from the sphere of the defence.

CHAPTER XX.

CONCLUSIONS SUMMARIZED.

1. *As to the cultus in the eucharist, the arguments put forward in its favour are valid ; the objections made against it are unsatisfactory. Its legitimacy and value have been vindicated.*

2. *As to the cultus of the reserved sacrament, here again the objections so far brought against it (objections directed at the same time against the cultus in the eucharist) have proved unsatisfactory. But we have still to consider special objections against this form of the cultus, some of which are unconvincing, while others appear to have great weight, even if they are not absolutely conclusive.*

PART IV

SPECIAL OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE CULTUS OF THE RESERVED SACRAMENT IN PARTICULAR.

CHAPTER XXI.

INTRODUCTORY.

In this last part of the book we deal with special objections against the cultus of the reserved sacrament in particular, objections unlike those we have already considered in that they are not applicable to the cultus of the sacramental presence in the eucharist.

In the next chapter we criticize objections that are, on the whole, unsatisfactory.

In the third chapter we come to a more serious objection based on the fact that the cultus of the reserved sacrament is the cultus of a presence that is not "a presence in action." This final objection appears to be valid, or, at the least, to have great weight.

In the fourth we deal with some replies to this final objection, none of which appear to be adequate.

In the last we recapitulate our conclusions.

CHAPTER XXII.

UNSATISFACTORY OBJECTIONS TO THE CULTUS OF THE RESERVED SACRAMENT.

The objections in this chapter deal with the following points: 1. Late development. 2. Alleged uncertainty of a permanent presence apart from its use for the purpose for which it was given—*i.e.*, for communion. 3. The charge that the cultus of the reserved sacrament militates against frequent communion. 4. The assertion that the cultus tends to a self-centred and anti-social attitude. 5. The accusation that the cultus is the direct result of the doctrine of transubstantiation.

I.

It has been objected that the cultus of the reserved sacrament is a very late development. It is admitted that lateness of development in itself is not, as we have already seen, a convincing objection. But in the present case it may be urged in addition that the step to the cultus of the reserved sacrament was so obvious and so tempting that, unless it had been considered illegitimate, it would have been taken at a very early period. Reservation was habitual from the first centuries onwards, and as soon as the cultus began in the eucharist it would naturally suggest

itself to many minds as fitting and helpful in the case of the reserved sacrament also. Yet this form of the cultus did not become prevalent for a thousand years and more, and the delay must have been due to the fact that it was deliberately disapproved.

The objection is, however, precarious. We cannot say on *a priori* grounds that any practice whatever is bound to suggest itself to men's minds, obvious as the practice may seem when it has once been started. Certainly, there is little historical evidence that the practice ever did suggest itself till a late date on any scale worth mentioning, and there is still less evidence that it suggested itself and was deliberately ruled out of court.

For similar reasons the Eastern custom of showing no outward reverence to the reserved sacrament has little or no argumentative weight against the cultus, as we do not know that among the Easterns the question of paying such reverence has ever been seriously contemplated.

II.

It has been objected that as the sacramental presence was given mainly for the purpose of communion we have no guarantee that the presence remains when the sacrament is used for other purposes.

But the objection involves results that cannot be accepted.

For, first, if we have no guarantee against the bread ceasing to be the Lord's body when it is not used for the purpose of communion, still less have we any guarantee that it becomes the Lord's body again when it is wanted for that purpose, without any

words of consecration spoken over it. If the words of consecration were necessary in the first instance, what right have we to assume that they are not necessary after a deconsecration has taken place ? What precedent have we for imagining that the purpose for which the bread is used, or the intention of the priest, or faithful reception by the communicant, can serve as a substitute for those words ? The theory forces us to say that we have no real security in communicating people with the reserved sacrament at all. A full communion service is necessary in every case.

Then again, it is quite possible that a priest, after communicating sick persons with the reserved sacrament, may bring back to the tabernacle a host that has been unconsumed. On the theory we are considering the host was deconsecrated when it was placed for the first time in the tabernacle, consecrated again when it was brought to the sick, and deconsecrated again when replaced in the tabernacle. This double process of consecration and deconsecration may be continued indefinitely.

A theory that leads to such results seems repugnant alike to reverence and to common sense. Certainly it lacks all ecclesiastical authority.

III.

It has been objected that the cultus of the reserved sacrament militates against the practice of frequent communion.

The same objection, we may reflect, has been brought with the same lack of proof against the

custom of non-communicating attendance. In the case of the reserved sacrament the objection is singularly ill-chosen, since of late years in the Roman Church, in which the cultus is universal, a large increase is reported in the number of daily communions, an increase connected with the decree of 1905 urging that the practice should be kept in view, and made the aim, of all the faithful.

IV.

It has been objected that the cultus of the reserved sacrament in the tabernacle is an essentially solitary form of worship, and that such forms of worship are self-centred and anti-social, leading to what has been called "a religion of the sacristy." Thus Scott Holland says:

"Round and round our churches the thick darkness of evil has hung unrepelled. The earth was full as ever of cruel habitations. The slums reeked with shame and misery. . . . And still the worshippers poured in to take of the Food, to feed of the Glory. . . . They took in so much. But what did they give out? If you wanted to know why, you had only to look in their little books of devotion, which were so wholly taken up with personal and individual details of self-examination, . . . that all memory of corporate and social responsibilities had vanished away. . . . And what we fear is anything that may serve to intensify this 'Religion of the Sacristy': and may hold the worshipper entranced within the shrine. . . . Anything that fascinates them to the spot has a special peril in it. . . . That is why it seems to us the worst moment in the world in which to add to the motives and the

attractions which keep the worshipper spell-bound in the Sacristy" (*Commonwealth*, March, 1917).

There seems, however, to be no good evidence in support of this objection. It would be difficult if not impossible to collect statistics to show that Christians among whom the cultus is practised are less social in their attitude than Christians by whom the cultus is ignored. The attempt to collect such statistics has never been made. Even if we had such evidence, it could be explained on other grounds. We could point out that in England, churches where the cultus has gained a hold are to some extent on their defence, and are on this account naturally tempted to pay excessive attention to this type of worship, and to pay less attention than they otherwise would to the claims of social service. The blame of this would rest, not on the cultus, but on the exceptional position in which such churches at present find themselves.

Again, if the objection is founded on the assertion that a solitary form of worship leads necessarily to an anti-social attitude and must therefore be discarded, it goes too far. We should be obliged, if it held good, to discard private prayers and retreats because in both cases we worship alone by ourselves apart from the world outside. The true remedy is, not to discard solitary worship, but to supplement it with worship that is congregational, and to see that we use it, not in order that we may withdraw from our responsibilities to the world, but in order that by being for a time alone with Jesus we may get strength to fulfil them. This was the method that our Lord so often employed with His disciples, and

it is the method He wishes to employ with us. We, too, are invited to come apart with Him and rest awhile. It is unwise to reject His methods on the plea that we are too busily engaged in active service on His behalf.

There are some enthusiasts for the cultus who will see in the objector's argument an opportunity of pressing their claims to still greater lengths. They will urge that as solitary worship before the tabernacle is liable to abuse, it should be supplemented by congregational services, and particularly by such services as Benediction, against which the charge of solitary worship cannot be directed. The objection turns in their hands into a weapon of which they will be delighted to take the fullest advantage.

V.

It is objected that the cultus of the reserved sacrament was the direct result of the doctrine of transubstantiation defined in the Lateran Council of 1215; that the cultus involves and depends upon this doctrine; and that, as the doctrine is false, the cultus is illegitimate.

The Rev. W. H. Freestone may be quoted in this connection:

"The original purpose of official reservation was purely practical. The development of any *cultus* of the reserved Eucharist was the direct outcome of the acceptance of transubstantiation as the orthodox belief" (*The Sacrament Reserved*, p. 266).

Before criticizing this objection we must make a few prefatory remarks. The Lateran definition

contains or implies two doctrines, the doctrine of the real presence, and the doctrine of transubstantiation, which is an explanation of that presence. These two doctrines, though the Council did not put them forward separately, are distinct, as we saw in the first chapter of this book, and the distinction must be kept in mind. Next, assuming that the objector's standpoint is Anglican, we will take it for granted for the sake of the argument that the doctrine of the real presence is Catholic and true, and that the doctrine of transubstantiation (so far as it is an addition to the doctrine of the real presence) is Roman and false. We also take it for granted that, as all writers agree, the cultus was not used during the period that preceded the definition.

We can now go on to show in what way the objection is open to criticism, and how far it is really supported by the authority of Mr. Freestone.

(*a*) It is true that the cultus did not develop before the Lateran definition, but it does not in the least follow that the cultus was the direct result of the definition. Another hypothesis might account for the facts. For a thousand years the main interests of the Church were focused, not on eucharistic questions (though, of course, the eucharist was always the practical centre of the Church's devotion), but on other matters, as, for instance, on the nature and person of our Lord. It was this lack of interest, rather than the lack of a definition, that was sufficient to account for the absence of the cultus. When the interest in the eucharist became dominant it gave rise to two tendencies, one theological, the other practical. The theological tendency resulted

in the definition; the practical tendency, fortified and stimulated by the definition, resulted in the cultus. The cultus might have come about even if the definition had never been framed, though, no doubt, the definition accelerated its development. The cultus was not the direct, but an incidental, outcome of the definition; both had a common cause.

(*b*) Even if the cultus was the direct outcome or result of the definition, it does not follow that it was the result of, or that it depends on, the Roman doctrine, rather than on the Catholic doctrine, both of which the definition includes. On the contrary, the cultus has a solid ground in the doctrine of the real presence by itself. It might well have come into existence if transubstantiation had never been defined. At any rate Anglicans who believe in the real presence are not likely to admit that the Roman view adds anything to the claims which the sacramental presence makes on their devotion.

In support of these two points we may quote from Dr. Weston. He says:

"The argument that many controversialists regard as conclusive against access to the tabernacle is that devotion to the reserved sacrament dates from the period of the definition of transubstantiation. This means that a particular belief about the sacrament produced a particular devotion.

"Curiously, in the East, the very same belief has not produced this devotion. . . . The only difference in statement is that the Easterns use the term transubstantiation with a reminder that they do not mean to say how the change takes place. Are we to suppose the multitude of Western people to be so alive to the metaphysical niceties of their

theologians as to see in the tabernacle a special witness to the theologians' formula, *on its philosophical side?*

"The fact is that East and West both see in the Blessed Sacrament the very Body and Blood of Christ. The Westerns worship Him in the tabernacle, the Easterns do not. And therefore we cannot, without very complete evidence, connect the devotion with the theologians' definition. . . . In short, the devotion and the definition may be found to have a common cause, and that, namely, love for the sacrament which was then being questioned in so many quarters" (*God With Us*, pp. 132, 133).

(*c*) Lastly, even if we admit that the cultus was the direct result of the Roman doctrine and that it would not have come about apart from that doctrine, it does not follow that it *still depends* on that doctrine. There is nothing paradoxical in this contention.

Browning describes in the opening lines of *The Ring and the Book* how the alloy which helps to make the gold ring, and without which the ring could not be made, can be dissolved, when the process of construction is complete, leaving the ring itself intact. It was in a way something like this that the exaggerated claims of the Papacy did much to enforce the Catholic claim of the Church to be a divine and visible society. So it is in the case we are considering. The Roman element in the doctrine, and the fact that it was put forward by what was thought to be the highest authority available, assisted the acceptance of the Catholic doctrine of the real presence, and so indirectly of the cultus.

But even if the cultus was originally the outcome

of transubstantiation, it may continue to exist without it. Now that it has gained its footing, it can hold its own, based, as it ought to be based, on the Catholic doctrine of the real presence. The gold, and our admiration for the gold, remain when the alloy has vanished. The spire does not fall when the scaffolding has been removed.

The cultus may be proved illegitimate on other grounds, but it is not illegitimate because of its direct or indirect connection with the doctrine of transubstantiation.

NOTE.—Other objections, which apply to the cultus of the sacramental presence in the eucharist as well as to the cultus of the reserved sacrament, have been considered in the previous part of this book, and we need not repeat them.

CHAPTER XXIII.

A FINAL AND VALID OBJECTION: THE CULTUS OF THE RESERVED SACRAMENT IMPAIRS THE BALANCE OF WORSHIP.

We arrive at the last, and, as it appears, a valid objection to the cultus of the reserved sacrament. It takes this form: The presence in the reserved sacrament is not, like the presence in the eucharist, "a presence of Christ in action." It is a passive presence, cut off from Christ's living and active relations with the Father and with us. The cultus, therefore, of the reserved sacrament cannot be grounded on the arguments which vindicate the cultus in the eucharist. It throws a disproportionate emphasis on an external and passive presence, and thus disturbs the balance of true worship.

This objection, if not conclusive, has, to say the least, considerable weight.

We must now consider the most forcible of the objections that are brought against the cultus of the reserved sacrament. If it turns out to be a valid objection (and there is some reason for thinking that it is valid), it will show that there is an essential difference between the two forms of the cultus, and that the reasons which support the one form by no means support the other.

This final objection must be discussed at some length. We work up to it as follows, leaving over attempts to meet it to the next chapter.

The heavenly spiritual world is not a world to which we look forward only in the future; it is the real world in which "we have our conversation," in which we live and move and have our being; the world of which St. Paul is thinking when he says that even now we exist in "the heavenly places." This world with all its aspects is a single whole, and God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is its centre and its source.

Further, in God, on whom this world depends, there is nothing that is merely passive and quiescent. He is eternally operative; He not only works; He *is*, as Aristotle said long ago, "unimpeded energy." The mutual relations of the divine Persons, and their relations to men, are active and living relations.

In the eucharist we are linked up with this heavenly world in a close and intimate relation. We come to meet Jesus, and Jesus comes to meet us; but He does not come alone, to relate us to Himself in isolation. He comes with the Father; God is in Christ reconciling us to Himself. His arrival does not, as it were, shift the centre of gravity of the spiritual universe; it does not bring one of its elements into disproportionate prominence at the expense of the rest. All the parts and aspects of that universe retain their mutual harmonies; while all of them, and all of them as one whole, through Christ's real presence, become to us more real and more present than they were before.

Again, in the eucharist Christ does not divest

Himself of His eternal activities; on the contrary, His presence is a presence *in action*. It is a presence marked by movement and energy; by the oblation of Himself to the Father and by the communication of Himself to the faithful. We come to meet Him that we may pay Him homage. Our purpose of adoration is, in a sense, distinct from our purpose of reception and from our purpose of joining in His sacrifice, but these three purposes, though distinct, are not separate; or, more accurately, they are not three purposes at all, but three aspects of one purpose.

Now, in the cultus of the reserved sacrament, Christ is not naturally regarded as existing in this close connection with the heavenly world, and with the different aspects of His eternal energy. One aspect of His existence, His eternal presence, is isolated from the rest, and is presented to us as a passive state. He is here with us not to act or to give, but to receive. Christ has been cut off from His eternal movement towards the Father. The balance and proportions of the heavenly world are impaired. Or, more accurately, we have impaired the balance and proportion of our worship, of our attitude to that world. It follows, therefore, that the arguments for the cultus in the eucharist are not applicable to the cultus of the reserved sacrament.

This is what Professor Scott Holland seems to have had in mind when he says:

"Everything that we know of (the sacramental presence in the eucharist) is Energy, Movement; Act, Action. In that living context all is clear. But (in the reserved sacrament) we have brought our

precious gift away out of its living environment in the high revealed action. It is now passive, portable, quiescent, shut up in a box" (*Commonwealth*, March, 1917).

It may be retorted, and rightly retorted, that this "shut up in a box" phrase is unfair and needlessly provocative. It condemns a practice by importing into it associations that it does not really involve. It would be equally easy to condemn the eucharist itself by speaking of Christ being "attached to a wafer," or by quoting Browning's line on the Mass about God being "made and eaten all day long." If Christ offers Himself to us under conditions that seem to put Him in a sense under man's control, it is none the less our business to accept Him as He gives Himself, not to be wiser than our Master, saying, like St. Peter, "This shall never be unto Thee. This be far from Thee, Lord."

Apart, however, from this dubious phrase, the objection in its main lines seems to hold good. We can sum it up in a few lines: There are different aspects of the relation in which Christ stands to us. The presence in the reserved sacrament, being a supernatural presence, when used in the cultus as a centre of our worship throws a disproportionate glamour on one of these aspects, and thereby weakens the rest. It is not, like the sacramental presence in the eucharist, a presence which relates us to Christ *in action*, to Christ in the fulness of His living relations to God and to man.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THIS FINAL OBJECTION NOT MET: VARIOUS INADEQUATE REPLIES.

This final objection is not adequately met by the various replies made against it which we proceed to consider—e.g., by the evidence of "experience" and conviction on which defenders of this form of the cultus lay great stress.

Those who use the cultus of the reserved sacrament will protest that it is in no way open to the objection urged in the last chapter. We must deal with their replies in detail.

I.

The tabernacle, they will say, does not in the least tend to make men think of Christ as passive and quiescent; it does not suggest the absence of His eternal activity. It brings home to us the fact of Christ Himself as a personal reality; it helps us to know Him with a personal knowledge; and to concentrate our minds on Him in a way which would otherwise be difficult or impossible. It does not bring before us any special truths about Christ—except, perhaps, the truth that "His delight is with the sons of men," the truth that He is indeed Emmanuel, God with us. But whatever truths we

habitually hold about Christ will normally come home to us with greater force along with this realization of Christ's personal reality. If we think of Him as working and active, as The Way to the Father, we shall think of these same truths when we are before the tabernacle, and we shall think of them when there with greater ease and concentration. If, on the contrary, we think of Him as habitually passive and quiescent (assuming that anyone does so), we shall carry these errors with us to the tabernacle; but the tabernacle will not be responsible for our errors. It helps us, as we have said, to *know Christ Himself*, and incidentally to think with greater fervour of *truths about Christ* which we know already.

If the objector urges that the tabernacle is dangerous because it does not directly suggest and enforce the truth of Christ's activity, and because we ought never to think of Christ without thinking explicitly and consciously of that activity, his objection goes altogether too far. When we sing in the *Te Deum* the verses about Christ as the King of glory, as the everlasting Son, seated at the right hand of the Father, we are adoring Christ without any explicit reference to any special aspect of His eternal activity. Such adoration is not therefore wrong or dangerous. It does not tend to make us ignore His eternal priesthood or His repeated gift of Himself in communion, though nothing is said about these truths. So it is in the case of the tabernacle. If we may use these verses of the *Te Deum*, or other words having the same meaning, in our private prayers, why may we not intensify our

prayers by access to the reserved sacrament? There we have with us the King of glory, the everlasting Son, and we can adore Him with a deeper grasp of His personal reality. The tabernacle does not add to or subtract from the number of truths we hold about Christ; it deepens our realization of Christ Himself. It helps us to know Christ with a personal knowledge, and, indirectly, it helps us to think of all the truths we know about Him.

The defender's reply does not meet the point.

The verses in the *Te Deum* about Christ occur in a long hymn which covers the whole Christian creed, and the *Te Deum* itself is only one part of the regular sequence of Christian services in which all aspects of Christ's relation to us have their place. If these verses were miraculously written in letters of fire all over the church, they might and would have a disproportionate prominence; we should be almost obliged to make them the main theme of our meditations; all other thoughts would seem subsidiary just in proportionate to the dazzling glow of these particular thoughts. Something of the kind tends to take place in the cultus of the reserved sacrament. The tabernacle gives us a supernatural presence which necessarily by excess of light darkens its surroundings. It is just because it seems such an overwhelming presence that it has its special fascination. It does suggest to us Christ who died and rose again, the King of glory; but it does not suggest directly His eternal activity on our behalf or His repeated gift of self-communication. It suggests a Christ Who exists, not to give, but to receive; a Christ

waiting there passively for our homage; and these direct suggestions tend to fill the whole horizon.

A supernatural presentation of this kind, when elevated into a central position in our worship, claims all or nothing. We cannot give it a divided allegiance. The special aspects of the faith which it suggests claim the whole of our attention. If we force ourselves to think of other aspects of the faith, we think of them in spite of, rather than by the help of, that presence. (We might suggest here, incidentally, that as this presence claims, as we say, "all or nothing," the Easterns are logical in accepting the latter alternative—*i.e.*, in treating it without even incidental worship, without any outward marks of worship at all. We make this suggestion in passing for what it is worth without laying stress upon it. The difficulty of their attitude is one of which there seems to be no authoritative or generally recognized explanation.)

II.

It may be said that the cultus of the sacramental presence in the eucharist is (like non-communicating attendance) a means by which we bring out one of the various aspects which exist together in the whole service, and that to do this is admittedly not wrong. Why, then, should we not use the reserved sacrament in the same way to bring out one aspect of the manifold relations in which we stand to Christ?

The plea, however, is not convincing. In the eucharist the different aspects are so closely combined that we are guarded against making any real separation between them, though we may mentally

emphasize now one and now another. Even in non-communicating attendance the eucharist is essentially a communion; a eucharist, in fact, would not be a eucharist unless it were a communion; the communion (even if no one communicates but the priest) is the culminating point to which the service moves, and round which it centres. But in the reserved sacrament the idea of communion is not directly suggested. It is true that the sacred species will eventually be consumed; but the idea of this consumption is not an idea that comes naturally to the worshipper's mind; it is not even a subsidiary part of the purpose for which he is there.

III.

It may be rejoined that wherever Christ is present He is wholly present, and present necessarily with all His attributes and activities. If He is acting as our great High Priest in heaven, He is also acting in the same capacity in the tabernacle. To think otherwise would be to think of Christ as divided. It is, therefore, incorrect to speak of Him in the tabernacle as passive. The cultus, therefore, does not leave His eternal activity out of account. It does not emphasize one aspect of our faith at the expense of the rest. It does not disturb the balance of worship.

The rejoinder is plausible, but it leads us into difficulties. If Christ is employed in the tabernacle and in the eucharist in exactly the same way, it is not easy to see why the eucharist is needed at all (except very occasionally in order to secure the supply of the consecrated hosts). In the tabernacle, Christ is offering Himself to the Father, just as He

is in the eucharist. He is also ready in the tabernacle to give Himself to us in communion. As a matter of fact it is quite usual for people who are not in ill-health to be communicated from the reserved sacrament in church, *e.g.*, after their confessions. The Anglican hymn, "And now, O Father," which is used so often at the eucharist, and which applies to it in all its aspects, could on this theory be used before the reserved sacrament with equal propriety. The theory, if worked out to its logical results, makes the eucharist unnecessary.

Now, defenders of the cultus would be unanimous in rejecting any such result. Their rejection seems to show that instinctively or consciously they recognize a real distinction between Christ's operation in the two modes of His sacramental presence. We conclude that, although wherever Christ is present He is wholly present, it does not follow that He is present *in act* in the tabernacle as He is present *in act* in the eucharist. And this is the main point and basis of the objection with which we are dealing.

IV.

Defenders of the cultus prefer sometimes to rest their case mainly on the evidence of experience and conviction. Against evidence of this kind, theological objections, they say, have little weight. Their argument may run on the following lines:

The sacramental presence helps concentration. Concentration is admittedly difficult. Even at its best it is more or less imperfect. To make it less imperfect most of us are glad to employ outward means, the bible, for example, or pictures, or a crucifix. This is where the sacramental presence

comes in. It provides, not merely suggestive symbols of Christ, but the actual presence of Christ Himself. It is true that in the sacramental presence we do not see Him, and to some people visible symbols may be more helpful. But the fact remains that those who have learned to use the cultus find the sacramental presence far more helpful than anything else. They are, indeed, convinced that in all places there is an effective relation between Christ and themselves; that He is always ready to hear and help. But they are convinced also that the sacramental presence makes it easier to realize His helpfulness; easier to realize this permanent effective relation; easier to realize the closeness of Him to Whom they are related; easier to fix their minds on Him; easier for them "to say their prayers."

Whatever we think of this conviction we cannot deny that it exists. Not only sentimental and ignorant people, but the learned, the intelligent, the well-instructed, the practical hard-headed men of business, feel that by access to the reserved sacrament they get real help. It would be a paradox to say that they do not feel what they say. We must take them at their word. It is, of course, true that their conviction does not settle the whole question. The help they derive may conceivably be outweighed by other disadvantages, or it may involve false ideas as to the nature of the sacramental presence. But directly or indirectly they do get the help of which they speak.

Dr. Weston makes this point clearly:

"We all require some mental image, or picture, when we pray, until we receive the highest gifts of prayer. God has given us His own image, incarnate,

as the centre of our prayer. And the sacramental presence of this Image exactly serves our need. 'Come unto Me,' He cries, for 'I and the Father are One.' It is therefore very hard to appreciate their position who are shocked at our desire for access to the tabernacle."

And again:

"Not for a moment do I believe that the prayer underlying such an experience as I have tried to describe is necessarily dependent on the sacrament. . . . But it is certainly far easier for some people to make it when the sacrament is present; and the sacramental presence does give to the prayer a special note and tone" (*God With Us*, p. 80).

In the same connection the Bishop of London brings up the old analogy, to which we have already referred, between the worship paid to the visible presence of Christ on earth and the worship paid to Him in the tabernacle:

"You might as well have stood in Palestine in the path of fifty thousand people who thought our Lord was in a certain house as resist what is at least the same number of people who wish to lay their burdens at His feet to-day" (Quoted in *English Church Review*, p. 164, 5).

The evidence, however, of mere feeling and conviction, on which the defender of the cultus lays so much stress, is inconclusive.

We have been brought back, as we have just said, to arguments with which we dealt in an earlier chapter—to arguments based on incidents narrated in the New Testament in which devotion was paid to our Lord's visible presence.

We have admitted that some opponents of the cultus have used these incidents altogether amiss. They have laid, for instance, great stress on our Lord's commands to St. Mary Magdalene, "Touch Me not, for I am not yet ascended." This command does seem to imply that after the ascension a local presence of Christ appealing to sight as well as to faith would be an undesirable presence, though it might very often be desired. It does not, however, in the least follow that a presence like the sacramental presence is undesirable, a presence related to space, appealing not to sight, but to faith only. This conclusion is often drawn, but it is not warranted by the premisses.

Nevertheless, the incident is relevant to the matter in hand. It does prove that a presence which people desire is not necessarily a presence they ought to desire; it does prove that a presence which they think they would find helpful and in some ways actually would find helpful, is not necessarily a presence which is helpful on the whole. Mary may have thought that perpetual access to a visible tangible Christ would be of immense practical advantage, of infinite comfort, and that she had a right therefore to expect and demand such access. We may think so too, but if we do, we are in error. Access to the tabernacle is not necessarily desirable because men desire it, because they find it in some ways extremely helpful, because it assists them to concentrate their thoughts, and because it helps them to say their prayers. The incident, then, has a negative force. It does not disprove the cultus of the reserved sacrament, but it does disprove the particular argument by which it is so often defended.

We may add this: The visible presence was withdrawn, while the sacramental presence has not been withdrawn. It follows that access to the sacramental presence is right and fitting. So far we are agreed. But it does not in the least follow that access to all forms of the sacramental presence is right and fitting —access, for instance, to the sacramental presence in the tabernacle. If there has been any truth in the considerations we have been urging, the presence that is really desirable is the presence in the eucharist, a presence which combines all the different aspects of Christ's relation to us, and that does not, like the presence in the tabernacle, place one of these aspects in the foreground and the rest in the shadow.

The defender of the cultus cannot meet these objections by falling back on the feeling men have of the helpfulness of the tabernacle, however strong and widely spread this feeling may be.

We may admit that there is no outward evidence that users of the cultus suffer in any way from the disturbance in the true balance of worship which it seems to involve. But this admission does not weaken the force of the objection. It is always difficult to prove on *a posteriori* lines that harm is done by a disproportionate tendency in religion, accompanied as it is by so many other tendencies acting and reacting upon it and upon one another, and by which the balance may be in a large degree redressed. In such cases we must reason mainly on *a priori* grounds. If a form of worship is not in accordance with the essential principles of worship, it stands condemned, whether bad results make themselves visible or not.

CHAPTER XXV.

GENERAL CONCLUSION.

The conclusions we have reached may be summarized as follows:

1. The cultus of the sacramental presence in the eucharist is justified both by its accordance with the principles of Christian devotion and by its value. We come to it, and we do well to come, with the purpose of adoration. Adoration is one of the purposes, or (more accurately) one aspect of the purpose, for which the sacramental presence is given us.

2. The cultus of the reserved sacrament is open to serious objections. Its legitimacy and value are, to say the least, doubtful.

3. As we said in the first chapter, we have been attempting to put together the chief considerations that can be urged for and against the cultus, with the object, not only or mainly of reaching a definite conclusion, but of bringing those who are disagreed into contact with each other's points of view. The bitterness of controversy and its fruitlessness is often due, not so much to the fact that controversialists are hopelessly at variance, as to the fact that they ignore, or that they seem to each other to ignore, what there is to be said for the positions to which they are opposed.

If the method of treatment adopted in this book tends in any way to allay this bitterness by producing mutual comprehension, then, even if mutual agreement seems for the present out of reach, it will have served in some measure the end for which it has been written.

INDEX OF AUTHORS QUOTED

PAGES

"An Anglican Writer" 38, 96, 108
Aquinas 28, 102
Baverstock .. .. .. 27, 43 *f.*, 95 *f.*, 99 *f.*, 101
Council of Trent 22, 29, 41, 45
Dalgairns .. .. 102 *f.*
Freestone 126
Gibergues 103
Gore .. .. .. 21, 38, 44, 71, 88, 92 *f.*, 99, 112
Goudge 89
Holland .. .. 124 *f.*
Hugon .. .. 29, 102 *f.*
Ingram (Bishop of London) 142
Moule 23
Mozley 117
Newman 26
Newport, Bishop of (Hedley) .. .. 22, 30 *f.*, 45, 104
Parsons 88
Richardson .. .. 35 *f.*
Rickaby 105
Streeter 38
Strong 25, 52
Underhill .. .. 63 *f.*
Waggett .. .. 23, 77 *f.*
Weston .. .. 46, 128 *f.*, 141 *f.*

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